Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1994

The State of Utah v. Gerald Gene Blubaugh : Brief
of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Utah Attorney General; Kris Leonard; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Plaintiff-Respondent.
James G. Clark; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Blubaugh, No. 940060 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5770

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 940060-CA

v.
GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

ADDENDUM

APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF MURDER, A FIRST
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-5-203 (SUPP. 1991), IN THE FOURTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE LYNN W.
DAVIS, PRESIDING.
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ADDENDUM A
Trial Transcript, p. 1363
(Trial Court's Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss)
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment
or in the Alternative for a New Trial

that this defendant did it.
Counsel asked what evidence do we have
that he applied the force that harmed the child.
The fact that the child was harmed.

We submit it.

THE COURT: I'll deny your motion to
dismiss, Counsel.

We'll call the jury.

proceed with your evidence.

You may

I think that the prima

facia case has been made.
MR. MUSSELMAN: Could we get about three
minutes to talk to our witnesses?
THE COURT: You can talk to them while
we're calling the jury.
(Recess taken)
THE COURT: The record ought to reflect
that the jury is seated in the State of Utah versus
Gerald Blubaugh.

We will then continue.

We've

been delayed a few moments as we have addressed
some legal matters, ladies and gentlemen of the
jury.
Counsel, then, are you prepared to call
your first witness?
MR. MUSSELMAN: We are, your Honor.
Defense calls Gerald Blubaugh.
THE COURT: Mr. Blubaugh, if you'll come
forward, please.

1 AA.*

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO ARREST JUL J M E N T OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL

v.

Case No. 921400519

GERALD G. BLUBAUGH,

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.
This matter came before the court on Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment or in
the Alternative for a New Trial filed on July 15, 1993. The State filed its responsive brief
on July 21, 1993, The court, having entertained oral argument on July 27, 1993 and
sentencing has been stayed until the court rules on the motion, now enters the following
RULING
The defendant moves this court to arrest judgment based on Rule 23 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 23 provides in pertinent part: "At any time prior to the
imposition of sentence, the court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant
shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense/
The defendant contends that the court should arrest judgment and enter a judgment of
dismissal based on the following : (1) there was no evidence presented that the defendant
caused the death of Faith Barney, (2) there was no evidence presented that the defendant
engaged in any conduct which created a grave risk of death to another, (3) there was no
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evidence that the defendant knew that any conduct which he engaged in created a grave risk
of death to another, (4) there was no evidence that defendant's conduct evidenced a depraved
indifference to human life, (5) there was no evidence that the defendant had ever harmed
Faith Barney in any way, and (6) there was substantial evidence that Christy Barney more
likely than not, caused the injuries which resulted in Faith Barney's death. In the alternative,
the defendant asks that the court to order a new trial based on an error in the jury verdict.
The state argues the court has previously ruled on defendant's motion to dismiss after
presentation of the state's case, finding that the state had presented a prima facie case, and
therefore, the defendant's motion is redundant. Additionally, the state maintains that the
state has presented sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.
I.

FACTS
On a Motion to Arrest Judgment, the trial must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the jury verdict. State v. Workman. 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1993);
State v. Diaz. 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Sherard. 818 P.2d 554,
556 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
On August 8, 1992, Faith Barney died at Primary Children's Hospital of injuries
which she had received a few days earlier. She had been flown by Life Flight from
Mountain View Hospital in Payson, Utah on August 5, 1992. After her death, an autopsy
was performed to determine the cause of death. The autopsy indicated extant cranial and
vertebral injuries. Specifically, the child's skull was fractured and the interspinous ligaments
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were severed at the thoracic vertebrae. The direct causes of death was described as anoxia
(deprivation of oxygen from the brain) which was caused either by the skull fracture or other
contemporaneous mechanism which deprived the child of oxygen for a sufficient amount of
time to trigger brain swelling. The testimony as to the time at which the injuries occurred
was not exact. The time frame varied from as long as twenty-four hours to three hours prior
to Faith's first CAT scan. The medical experts testified that the injuries which caused the
child's death were non-accidental trauma.
In addition to the injuries which resulted in the child's death, the state presented
evidence of battered child syndrome. Faith had suffered a broken right arm and a broken
left arm in the recent past. The child's right arm was treated approximately one week after
the break. The broken left arm was never treated. The injury to the child's right arm was
deemed a non-accidental trauma by the treating physician. The injuries to the child did not
begin to occur until after the defendant began living with Christy Barney.
Faith's caretakers were Christy Barney and the defendant, Christy's live-in boyfriend.
The defendant had joint care and custody of Faith. The defendant was present in the home
on the evening of August 4, 1992, and in the early morning hours of August 5, 1992. The
defendant was the first person to awake on the morning of August 5, 1992 and alerted
Christy Barney to the child's erratic breathing and possible respiratory problems. The state
presented evidence that the defendant struck the child on numerous times, at least on one
occasion the defendant struck the child in the head. The defendant maltreated the child. The
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defendant would restrain the child in his arms by pressing her legs into her chest in order to
stop her from crying and would forcibly hold her eyes shut until the child would go to sleep.

The defendant denied that he engaged in any harmful conduct towards the child and
presented evidence suggesting that Christy Barney was more likely than not to have caused
the injuries which resulted in death,
H.

APPLICABLE LAW
The trial court may arrest judgment "when the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of
the crime that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element."
State v. Workman. 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1993). This standard is the same
standard which an appellate court adheres to in determining the sufficiency of the evidence
on appeal. Id. at 4. See also State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983); State v.
McCardelL 652 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1982).
The Workman court commented on the important role that the jury plays when
evidence is controverted: "When the evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury
serves as the exclusive judge of both credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
particular evidence. . . . Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or
reweigh the evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor or the jury verdict."
Id. at 4 (citations omitted).

4
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When the evidence presented consists entirely of circumstantial evidence, the role of
the trial court is to determine first "whether there is any evidence that supports each and
every element of the crime charged," and lastly, "whether the inferences that can be drawn
from the evidence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove
each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt," Workman, 212 Utah Adv.
Rep, at 4, "A guilty verdict is not legally vand if it is based solely on inferences that give
rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Id.
The defendant was charged with depraved indifference murder pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-203(1) (c) which states: "(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor:
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life engages in
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (2) requires that the elements of a criminal offense
contain a conduct element (actus reus) and a culpable mental state element (mens rea).

The

Utah Supreme Court set forth the elements of depraved indifference murder in State v.
Bolsinger. 699 P.2d 1214, 1219 (Utah 1985) as follows: (1) "the defendant engaged in
conduct which created a grave risk of death to another and that conduct resulted in the death
of another," (2) "the defendant knew that his conduct or the circumstances surrounding his
conduct created a grave risk of death to another," and (3) "the defendant acted under
circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life - a qualitative judgment to
be made by the jury in determining the extent of the defendant's conduct. It is not a
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description of the mens rea involved in the commission of the crime, but an evaluation of the
actus reus."

Id.

There is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a finding that the defendant
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another. The child suffered from
battered child syndrome and the injuries which resulted in her death were non-accidental.
The defendant admitted to hitting the child on the head on at least one occasion. There was
testimony concerning the improper method the defendant used to force the child to stop
crying and go to sleep. The jury could draw from this testimony that the defendant conduct
was consistent with the child's back injury. The defendant had joint care of the child prior
to her hospitalization and was present in the home the evening prior to and the morning of
her hospitalization. Additionally, the physical abuse of the child did not begin until after the
defendant became a joint caretaker of the child. The jury could make the reasonable
inference from this evidence that the defendant engaged in the conduct which gravely risked
the death of death to Faith Barney during the late evening of August 4 or early morning of
August 5.
There is sufficient evidence that the defendant knew that the conduct would create a
grave risk of death. The jury could draw the inference that the defendant knew that striking
a child on the head with sufficient force to cause a skull fracture would cause a grave risk of
death.
There is sufficient evidence that the defendant's conduct evidenced a depraved
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indifference to human life. The jury was presented with evidence that the defendant had
acted with indifference in the past to the child. The defendant, in response to criticism over
his forcibly squeezing the child to make the her stop crying, squeezed harder. There is
evidence that the defendant, who had received EMT training in the military, and was one of
the caretakers of the child, failed to immediately treat the child's broken arms. Additionally,
with respect to the injuries which resulted in the child's death, the jury could reasonably
infer that these injuries resulted from conduct evidencing a depraved indifference to human
life.

m.

CONCLUSION

The defendant was found guilty of murder by a jury of his peers. A panel of
prospective jurors, totalling approximately 70 citizens, was summoned. Each answered an
extensive jury questionnaire. Counsel extensively evaluated the questionnaires before in
camera voir dire began.
Mr. Blubaugh was present during all stages of the jury selection process and
consulted with his attorneys. Li addition, two alternate jurors were chosen. Where any
inkling of bias, prejudice or passion appeared in the response to the jury questionnaire or in
voir dire, the State of Utah either challenged for cause or this Court granted defenses motion
to remove for cause. The jury selection process took several days. The parties exercised all
peremptory challenges and the jury was impaneled and sworn.
The court administered the following oath to the jury:

7
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Do you and each of you solemnly swear to well and truly try the issues pending
between the plaintiff and the defendant and render a true and just verdict according to
the evidence and the instructions of the court, so help you God?
It is the opinion of the court that the jury in this case was extremely conscientious; the jurors
were very attentive, some took notes, they were timely, they appeared to listen very carefully
during presentation of the evidence. This court has tremendous respect for their personal
sacrifices and the fact that they attended to civic duty so willingly. They served in an
unsolicited, unwelcome, difficult role, but one which is significant and important to the
administration of justice.
Where there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict, this court will give
deference to the jury's decision. Regardless of how this judge personally feels about whether
the state proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be improper for this court to
invade the exclusive domain of the jury and to substitute its judgment for that of the jury. It
is the role of the factfinder, in this case the jury, to weigh the evidence and assess the
credibility of the witnesses.
Jurors can take into account the ability and the opportunity to observe and know the
things about which each witness has testified, the memory, manner, and conduct of each
witness while testifying, any interest each witness may have in the result of the trial, and the
reasonableness of such testimony considered in light of all the evidence in the case. The
defendant testified in this case. In weighing the defendant's testimony, the jury could take
into consideration the defendant's interest in the matter. The jury had the duty also to give

8
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Dated at Provo, Utah this £Z_ day of /%6/oJ
BY THE COURT

Jim Taylor, Deputy County Attorney
Linda Anderson, Esq.
John Musselman, Esq.

10

. 1993.

such testimony the same fair and impartial consideration that it is instructed to give all the
evidence in the case.
The jury was instructed to conscientiously and dispassionately consider the evidence
and to apply the law to reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such
verdict would be. What credibility the jury accorded the defendant's testimony is unknown.
Defendant's challenge assumes that the jury believed defendant's version.
The defendant's arguments are essentially a reiteration of defendant's closing
arguments.

They evidently did not persuade the jury of Mr. Blubaugh's peers then and are

not persuasive as a matter of law now. Accordingly, the court denies defendant's Motion to
Arrest Judgment or in the Alternative for a New Trial.

9

•-C-

618

TabB

ADDENDUM B
Jury Instruction No. 4
Record, pp. 424-23

INSTRUCTION NO.

4

You are instructed that "depraved indifference to human life"
means that the defendant acted knowingly in creating a grave risk
of death which he knew was grave in that it created a highly likely
probability of death and that the defendant's conduct evidenced an
utter callousness and indifference toward human life.

f" • -

Fourth &-':" ,D..

D. JOHN MUSSELMAN ( 5 5 8 2 ) f o r :
ZABRISKIE & MUSSELMAN
Attorneys for Defendant
3507 N o r t h U n i v e r s i t y Avenue
Hanover B u i l d i n g , S u i t e 370
Jamestown S q u a r e
Provo, U t a h 84604
Telephone:
(801) 375-7680
Facsimile:
(801) 375-7686
LINDA ANDERSON ( 5 9 0 8 ) f o r :
ANDERSON, DREDGE, STRINGER fc BLAKELOCK, P . A .
Attorneys f o r Defendant
2230 N o r t h U n i v e r s i t y Parkway
S u i t e 9-D
Provo, UT 84604
Telephone:
(801) 375-7678

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

vs.
GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH,

Case No. 921400519 FS

Defendant.
—-oooOooo—
COMES NOW the Defendant above named, by and through his
counsel of record, D. JOHN MUSSELMAN and LINDA ANDERSON, and
does hereby make his objections to certain jury instructions
heretofore requested by the Plaintiff.

For convenience in making

reference to Plaintiff's requests herein, Defendant has numbered

the Plaintiff's requests PI through P20 and has attached a
complete copy of the Plaintiff's Proposed Jury Instructions*
1.

Defendant objects to request P3 upon the ground and for

the reason that the said requested instruction fails to
adequately state the elements of the offense charged and,
moreover, the Defendant's request D3 more accurately and
adequately states the elements of the offense and more correctly
states the law as to the elements.
2.

Defendant objects to request P4 upon the ground and for

the reason that the said requested instruction fails to
adequately define the term "depraved indifference" and is, in
fact, a misstatement of the law as to that definition.

The said

requested instruction was specifically disapproved of in the case
of State v. StandifordP 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988).

The State has

submitted an alternative request P4 which is a correct statement
of the law, but the Defendant has submitted a modified requested
instruction D4a which is a correct statement of the law and more
accurately and adequately defines the term "depraved
indifference" according to current rulings of the Utah Supreme
Court.
3.

Defendant objects to request P7 upon the ground and for

the reason that the said requested instruction is premature
inasmuch as a lesser included offense instruction must be

2
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ADDENDUM C
Trial Transcript, pp. 758-60
Jury Instruction No. 19

J. Q

that that will not inconvenience you in terms of
a ping-pong match sending you back to the jury
room, and then back to the jury box, and back
and forth.

But these are important matters. As

they come up during the course of the trial
we'll need to rule upon them.
Likewise, objections will be made during
the course of this trial.

Some of those can be

ruled upon fairly quickly and very briefly based
upon what the Court has heard. And that can be
done while you are thus convened as a jury.
There may be instances, though, when those
objections involve other legal matters or
additional arguments before the Court.

And at

that time you would also be excused to the jury
room; and at such time as those have been ruled
upon, invited back to further consider the
evidence before the Court.
Now, as I read to you the-- I believe the
first jury instruction, which outlined the
charge here, murder, a first-degree felony, it's
also my duty to advise you of the maximum
penalties in this case.
First-degree felony, murder or otherwise,
is punishable by incarceration in the Utah State

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
• ^
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1

Prison for a period of five years to life

2

together with the possibility of the imposition

3l of a $10,000 fine and/or both.
4|
5

Now, with those preliminary

instructions

that I've read to you, and with the general

61 outline that I've given to you concerning the —
7

how we will proceed in this case, I'll

8

of counsel whether there are any other

9

preliminary matters that ought to be brought to

10

inquire

the attention of this jury before we proceed?

11

MR. TAYLOR:

12

I have one.

May we

approach the bench briefly?

13

THE COURT:

You may.

14

( Off the record at the bench, not

15

reported.)

16

THE COURT:

17

Going back on the record.

I've advised you of the penalties-- the

181 possible penalties imposed in a first-degree
19

felony.

20

I need to further bring to your attention

21

that ultimately, if there is a conviction in the

221 case, it would be the province of the Court to
23

impose that penalty. You're not involved in the

241 penalty phase whatsoever. You have nothing to do
251 with that. It would not make any recommendations

I
Lesley Nelson -- CSR
* W^ w

I0 J

1

or even be present while-- there would be any

2

imposition of a penalty 1

3

defendant were convicted in the case.

41

in fact, the

Anything further, then, in this particular

51 case?
6

MR. TAYLOR:

No.

7

THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen, it's

8

the intention, then, of the State of Utah and

9

the defense to proceed this afternoon at 1:30,

10

at which time the State will make opening

11

statements at that point in time.

12

You are then free until that hour, until

13

1:30. And once again, as 1 excuse you, albeit a

14

bit early for the lunch hour, I will advise you

15

not to discuss this case with anyone, amongst

16

eachother or anyone else during the pendancy of

17

these matters, not to attempt to learn anything

18

about this case outside the presence of this

19

courtroom.

20

Some of you may have already taken some

21

notes.

I'll advise you not to share those notes

22

with anyone in the jury.

23

attempt in any form or fashion to learn anything

24

about this case from the media, from radio,

And lastly, not to

25| television, or the newspaper. And with that

Lesley Nelson -- CSR
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INSTRUCTION NO. .
In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss
nor consider the subject of penalty or punishment, as that is a
matter which lies with the court, and other court proceedings.
The penalty and punishment for the crime charged must not in any
way affect your decision as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.

TabD

ADDENDUM D
Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars
Information
Affidavit

Ui...i LV.

— Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

v.

RULING
Case No. 921400519
Judge Lynn W. Davis

GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars. The
Court heard the oral argument of counsel on April 27, 1993. The Court has reviewed the
file, considered the memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel, and upon being
advised in the premises, now makes the following:
RULING

Article 1, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides, "In criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the r i g h t . . . to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him [and] to have a copy thereof.M The Utah Supreme Court has explained this section to
mean that "the accused be given sufficient information so that he or she can know the
particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct and can adequately prepare his or her defense."
State v. Bell. 770 P.2d 100, 103 (Utah 1988), quoting. State v. Fulton. 742 P.2d 1208, 1214
(Utah 1987). A criminal defendant's right to a bill of particulars is provided for in Rule 4

• - J ^ v.
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(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which states as follows:
When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him
to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of
particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days
thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. . . . The request for
and contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual
information needed to set forth the essential elements of the particular offense
charged.
The focus in a bill of particulars is the allegation that the defendant's ability to prepare for
trial is impeded due to some vagueness in the allegedly deficient pleading. State v. Swapp.
808 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Bell. 770 P. 2d 100, 106 (Utah 1988).
On November 17, 1992, the defendant submitted a bill of particulars seeking "the
prosecution to set out in writing the factual information needed or relied on exclusively by
the prosecution to establish the essential elements of this offense charged." On December 2,
1992, the court received plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion for Bill Particulars. The
State essentially argues that the information filed along with a four page affidavit in support
of the warrant of arrest, as well as volumes of information given in discovery has more than
adequately allowed defendant to prepare for trial. A preliminary hearing has also been
conducted in this case and no appeal has been taken from the bind over order.
In Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs objection to Defendant's Motion for Bill of
Particulars, the defendant essentially argues that the Information and Affidavit are
impermissibly vague because the defendant is unable to distinguish which of three possible

2

theories the state intends to use in order to prove the "depraved indifference" element of the
charged offense.

A bill of particulars "is not a device to enable the defendant to obtain a

preview of the prosecutor's evidence. Swapp. at 118. "However, the defendant is entitled
to whatever information the prosector has that may be useful in helping to fix the date, time
and place of the offense." Id. at 188-19. There is nothing in defendant's Response which
demonstrates any confusion as to the elements of the offense charged. In fact, the defendant
has been charged only under section 76-5-203 (1) (c). The defendant, at the time the
Information was served, was put on notice of the nature of the offense, the elements needed
to be proven by the state, and defendant's conduct which the state believes supported the
charges. Defendant's inquiry into how the state intends to prove its case is outside the scope
of a bill of particulars.
The Court exercises its discretion and finds, after reviewing the information and the
affidavit supporting it, that the defendant has adequately been informed of the time, place and
date of the charged offense. The Court finds that the defendant has received ade* uate notice
of the facts underlying the "depraved indifference" murder statute. In support of this finding
the Court notes that the affidavit supporting the Information contains information pertaining
to previous injuries suffered by the victim prior to the injury immediately causing death.
The affidavit identifies the defendant as one of the victim's two caretakers. Additionally, the
affidavit recounts some of the medical examiner's autopsy report detailing the cause of death
as resulting from a blow to the head and back received shortly before death.

3

Accordingly, the Court hereby denies defendant's Motion for a Bill of Particulars.
Dated at Provo, this 3

day of y^f/i/

. 1993.

BY THE COURT

cc:

Jim Taylor, Deputy County Attorney
John Musselman, Esq.
Linda Anderson, Esq.
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FILED
otu?lJna'cls>n

D
'strictCourt
r A mil A °^ U\State of Utah

KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 370-8026

CARMA B. SMITH, Cter

IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK I/EPARTMENT
STATE OP UTAHf
INFORMATION
Plaintiff,
VS.

GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH
144 East Center
Spanish Fork,
Utah
DOB:

Criminal No.

?<£/- £ 7?

09-09-68

CHRISTY BARNEY
144 East Center
Spanish Fork,
Utah
DOB:

01-18-75
Defendant(s).

Kay Bryson, Utah County Attorney, State of Utah, accuses the
defendant(s) of the following crime(s):
MURDER, a First Degree felony, in violation of 76-5-202,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that the defendants, on
or about August 5, 1992, in Utah County, Utah, acting under
circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life
engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another
and thereby caused the death of another, Faith Barney.
Information is based on evidence sworn to by:
Spanish Fork PD

Steven Adams,

Defendant(s) appears by: Summons ( ) Warrant (X)

10-15-M

In-Custody ( )

KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
JAMES R. TAYLOR #3199
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 Eest Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 370-8026
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, SPANISH FORK DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH#

t
Plaintiff,

vs.

t

APPIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OP
WARRANT OP ARREST

t

GERALD G. BLUBAUGH and
CHRISTY L. BARNEY#

s

Criminal No.

Defendant(s).
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH )

STEVEN G. ADAMS, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes
and says:
1. I am a police officer for the City of Spanish Fork, Utah
County, Utah. I have been employed as a police officer for seven
years and hold the rank of Sergeant.
2. I am currently assigned as case officer on the death of a
child, Faith Barney, a fourteen month old female, occurring August
8, 1992.
3. On July 14, 1992, I was informed by the Children's Justice
Center and the Department ~f Family Services that Faith Barney had
been referred to the Departent of Family Services for an "unusual"
elbow break. The Department requested for the follow up by the
Spanish Fork Police Department. I contacted Mountain View Hospital
in Payson where the child had been taken for treatment for the
broken arm.
I spoke to emergency room doctors and nurses who
treated the child who told me that they were informed that the
caretakers for the child were Christy Barney, the child's mother
and Gerald Gene Blubaugh, a live-in boyfriend of the mother. These
caretakers had explained to medical personnel that the child had
fallen off a bed causing the elbow break. The medical evidence
observed by the doctors and nurses at the emergency room at
Mountain View Hospital was inconsistent with an injury of that

sort.
4. Doctors L. Dean Egbert, Stan Green and Scott Jackson
explained to me that the elbow break x-rays indicated a break
occurring at least ten to twelve days prior to the child being
brought to the emergency room at Mountain View Hospital on July 1,
1992.
5. On July 31, 1992, I spoke with Christy Barney at her
residence in Spanish Fork. Christy Barney restated the description
of the child falling off the bed and breaking her elbow that was
given to emergency room personnel at Mountain View Hospital and was
unable to provide another plausible explanation for the elbow
break.
6. Faith Barney was observed on July 31, 1992, in the home of
Christy Barney. The child had dirt on all of her extremities and
her face and had what appeared to be food on her body and face.
She did appear to be well fed and ambulating and moving under her
own power.
7. On August 5, 1992, the Spanish Fork Ambulance was called
to the Barney home in Spanish Fork. Faith Barney was reported to
be seizing, vomiting and unresponsive. The child was transported
at that time to Mountain View Hospital.
8. On August 5, 1992, Chief Rosenbaum of the Spanish Fork
Police Department was requested by the ambulance team to respond to
the Barney home. Rosenbaum spoke with Christy Barney and Gerald
Gene Blubaugh who are the adult residents of that address. The two
related the following series of events:
At 0500 Gerald Gene
Blubaugh rose for work. Gerald Gene Blubaugh heard the baby having
a difficult time breathing. Blubaugh awoke Christy Barney and
Barney attended to the child while Blubaugh left for work. Barney
reports that she held the child for a short time and felt the child
was breathing. Barney then laid the child back down in the crib
face up. At 0800 Barney awoke and found the child face down in
what appeared to be vomit. Barney picked the child up and found
the child to be gray in color, limp, and eyes rolled upwards.
Barney put a robe on and took the child to a neighbor where a phone
was located and 911 was called. Ambulance personnel arrived and
took the child to Mountain View Hospital.
9. On August 5, 1992, Faith was flown by Life Flight from
Mountain View Hospital to Primary Children's Hospital.
10. On August 8, 1992, I was informed by Doctor Malloney of
Primary Children's Hospital that Faith had become deceased.
11. On August 9, 1992, I viewed the autopsy of Faith Barney.
The Medical Examiner has issued a complete autopsy report providing
the following opinion:
This fourteen month old Caucasian

female, Faith N.

Barney, died as a consequence of craniocerebral injury
due to blunt force injury of the head. A skull fracture,
whose microscopic appearance is consistent with a
fracture of several days duration, was present on the
left parietal bone. No cerebral impact or contrecoup
injuries w^re present, suggesting that the head may have
been sta* cnary when struck. The sequelae of the blunt
force in .ry of the head were seizures, cerebral edema,
and neuronal ischemia/anoxia.
The pattern of subgaleal hemorrhage of the left scalp,
which involved multiple areas and a greater area of the
scalp than that overlying the fracture, suggests that the
scalp may have been subjected too more than a single blow
in the recent past. The patter^ of fibrosis and vascular
proliferation of the galea ci :he left parietal scalp
suggests injury also occurred in the relatively remote
past.
The interspinous ligaments of one segment of the thoracic
vertebral column were transected, and the underlying
epidural space was hemorrhagic. The most probable injury
mechanism is extreme forward flexion of the torso. On
the basis of the postmortem findings it cannot be
determined whether the cranial and vertebral injuries
were inflicted at the same time or at different times.
12.
Officers of the Spanish Fork Police Department have
interviewed Gerald Gene Blubaugh on two separate occasions.
Blubaugh has admitted striking the child more than once on the
child's head and still is unable to give any satisfactory
explanation for the injuries resulting in her death or the breaks
to her arm shortly before her death.
13. Officers have also interviewed Christy Barney on several
occasions with similar results. Mrs. Barney is unable to explain
any of the injuries to the child including the irjuries immediately
resulting in her death or to give a satisfactory explanation for
the broken arm.
14. I have interviewed all known or available neighbors and
associates of Blubaugh and Barney and have determined that the only
persons providing care for Faith Barney between August ""1st and
August 5th of 1992 were Gerald Gene Blubaugh and Christy Barney.
Prior to that time they were the principal caretakers. She was not
left in the care or custody of anyone else for any significant
period of time except during the weekend of the 24th oi July, 1992,
when she was cared for by an adult babysitter. The babysitter has
been interviewed and there is no documentation or evidence that
there were any injuries to the child during that period of time.
15. Most of the individuals interviewed in connection with
this case have described the method of parenting and caretaking by
Gerald Gene Blubaugh and Christy Barney as violent, neglectful, and

abusive. Numerous incidents of physical abuse and neglect have
been described during the month preceding the child's death.
16.
Gerald Gene Blubaugh's employer, Mr. Blubaugh, and
Christy Barney have all explained to me that his work has been
inconsistent and that because of the death of Faith he has been
discouraged. Officers have observed Mr. Blubaugh during daytime
hours when he would normally be expected to be at work and have
suspected that his work is "spotty". Blubaugh is a cement laborer
who would have work when his employer is able to contract for work.
17.
Christy Barney attends Landmark High School and is
approximately two years from graduation. Mrs. Barney is pregnant
with the child of Mr. Blubaugh. Mrs. Barney has been informed that
if she is unable to graduate this year that her unborn child will
be taken from her. Contacts with Landmark High School indicate
that the likelihood of her graduation within a year is very slight.
18. Both Blubaugh and Barney have spoken about leaving the
area with Blubaugh's mother, Ruth Peterson, as recently as August
14, 1992.
DATED this

/s ^

day of October, 1992.

[•EVEN^G:

ADAMS

Affiant
PROOF BY AFFIDAVIT HAVING BEEN MADE THIS DAY BEFORE ME, THE
COURT FINDS THAT THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
WARRANT OF ARREST. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS isg'*
DAY OF OCTOBER, 1992.
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THE COURT: At least as the defense's

2

perspective is is that you're not going to attack

3

her credibility.

4

corroborate her --

5

What you're going to do is

MR. TAYLOR: That's right, and if her

6

credibility is not at issue, when she says she

7

doesn't remember, then we accept that she doesn't

8

remember.

9

remember.

10

It doesn't matter why she doesn't

If it matters why, then we're talking

11

about her character, because they want to infer

12

from that she could have committed this crime.

13[ That's what's inappropriate.
14

THE COURT: Well, let me retire to

15

chambers, Counsel.

16

this motion.

17

(Recess taken)

18
19
20

I wish I had 30 days to rule on

I will be back by 11.

THE COURT: Back on the record in State of
Utah versus Gerald Blubaugh, Case No. 921400519.
Counsel and the defendant are present.

21

The Court's had an opportunity to review both the

22

motion in limine and the response, and makes the

23

following ruling.

24
25

I've reduced it to writing, Counsel,
because it does involve a reference to a case or

2

The defendant during opening statement

3

and in chambers has indicated his intent to offer

4

testimony concerning Christy Barney,

5

that Christy Barney suffers from a mental condition

6

which causes her to suffer memory loss, and that

7

during memory loss she acts violently.

8
9

Specifically

The defense intends to show specific
instances of conduct towards the mother, towards

10

the brother and the baby, together with

11

professional testimony regarding the mental

12

condition of Christy Barney.

13

The defendant's purported purpose in

14

seeking admittance of this testimony is to prove

15

that Christy Barney was more likely to have

16

committed this offense.

17

testimony through expert witnesses and through the

18

extrinsic evidence of these particular events.

The defense seeks this

19

The State has objected to this evidence

20

based on Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence,

21

that the State contends that proffered testimony is

22

in fact character evidence and ought to be

23

excluded.

24

prohibits introduction of this testimony, and the

25

testimony is also prohibited by Rule 608.

The State contends that Rule 404(a)

15S3

1!
2

Rule 404 must be read in conjunction with
the entire Article 4, Relevancy and its Limits,

31

Article 4 begins by setting forth the

4

rules for determining relevancy and the

5

admissibility of relevant evidence.

Rule 404(a) is

61 an extens.cn of these initial sections.
7

404(a) states evidence of a person's

8

character or a trait of his character is not

9

admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted

10

in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.

11

Historically, courts have reached that conclusion

12

by virtue of the fact that it's more prejudicia

13

than probative.

14

The rule then lists several exceptions.

15

This court notes that none of the exceptions listed

16

in 404(a) apply in this case, but the rule does not

17

end there.

18

While Rule 404(a) closes the door to the

19

admittance of character evidence for the purpose of

20

proving that the witness acted in conformity on a

21

particular occasion, Rule 404(b) opens the door to

22

evidence offered for the enumerated purposes of

23

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

24

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or

25

accident.

±oo3

1
2

Therefore, the initial inquiry must also
include a determination of whether the proffered

31 evidence meets one of these exceptions.

The Court

41 finds that it does.
5

The defendant's case is that another

6

person, Christy Barney, killed the child.

7

proffered testimony is relevant to this point.

8

proffered testimony obviously goes to the identity

9

of the person who injured the child.

10
11

The
The

It may also

go to opportunity, intent and knowledge.
While it may also corroborate Christy

12

Barney's testimony and thus indirectly evidences

13

her veracity, it does so only indirectly.

14

Durham, in referring to State verse Rimmasch as

15

relied upon by the State of Utah, writing in her

16

concurrent opinion states, "Much expert testimony

17

indirectly tends to show that another witness

18

either is or is not telling the truth.

19

alone does not preclude admission of testimony

20

under Rule 608."

21

Justice

That fact

Simply put, Rule 608 does not apply in

22

this situation, and will not act as either a bar or

23

a door to the admittance of evidence indirectly

24

supportive or destructive of a witness' veracity.

25

Accordingly, this court denies plaintiff's

1554

1

motion in limine.
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2

determination of admittance of presentment of

3

evidence based upon proper foundation, the

4

establishment of the credentials of expert

5

witnesses, and still deal with the issue of

6

relevancy.

71

With that, we'll invite the jury back in.

Si

MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, one matter as

9

they're coming in.

Yesterday during the testimony

10

of Kenny Revoir it became apparent we would call a

11

rebuttal witness.

12

here during the course of the trial.

13

with counsel about him.

14

no problem with her remaining, because she's only

15

going to talk about that testimony which she's

16

already heard.

17
18

That rebuttal witness has been
I've spoke

He's agreed that there's

THE COURT: Exclusively as it relates to
his?

19

MR. TAYLOR: Right.

20

MR. MUSSELMAN: We have no objection, and

21

furthermore, your Honor, frankly I don't think

22

there's any objection for us to have on a rebuttal

23

witness that we can't necessarily be made aware of.

24

MR. TAYLOR: Normally I would have

25

immediately excluded her, but she's asked to

15SJ
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1

against those that she loves and that she's grown

2

up with and cares about.

3

Furthermore, we believe that when Chris is

4

called to the stand again, that she will testify

5

that

6

8 o'clock, she will recall the circumstances

7

surrounding that awakening, so to speak, as very

8

reminiscent of the time when she -- this time when

9

she kind of came to.

when

she

woke

up

on

August

the

5th at

I don't really know how to

10

phrase this, but came to and had a butcher knife in

11

her hand chasing her brother and her cousin.

12

Those are referred to in letters.

That

13

incident is referred to in letters.

14

some correspondence between the two events herself

15

on testimony.

16

She will draw

THE COURT: Well, she's best able to do

17

that.

18

appear to me, Counsel, as it relates to that

19

evidence —

20

give some additional background regarding the fact

21

that they are adopted or that they are brother and

22

sister.

23

regarding any of that background, but perhaps you

24

could point to that if you wish.

25

Not him, it would seem to me.

It does

I don't know whether it's relevant to

I don't see the real relevancy there

But it is more prejudicial

than

< r '-

probative.

It's too remote in time f and I do

believe that it is factually dissimilar to this
particular case.

There's no evidence in this case

that there's a knife used or a weapon used to
administer any harm to this particular child.
It's too remote in time.
injury as it relates to that.
brother.
child

There was no

It's an older

It's not a younger sibling.

It's not a

involved.
So I question/ number one, its relevancy.

I believe it's more prejudicial than probative.
It's factually dissimilar.
time.

It's too remote in

Do you wish to call him in light of that

ruling?
MS. ANDERSON: Well, I think under those
circumstances it would probably be somewhat
fruitless.

However, I do think it's important in

light of that ruling that we also consider the
calling of Cory Talbot.

Cory Talbot would

corroborate Mr. Lowe's testimony for that one
particular event.

I would assume that your ruling

would be similar.
MR. TAYLOR: We would have the same
objection.
THE COURT: I make the same ruling if it's

OD3

based upon that same evidence.

It would appear to

me that the fact that a cousin was either involved
or witnessed it, it's still too remote in time.
There's no injury involved.
cousin.

Tell me the age of the

If the cousin is a minor child of maybe

two or one or whatever.
MS. ANDERSON: No, he's of a
contemporaneous age.
THE COURT: If he's approximately the same
age as Tom Lowe, then that's another factor that
this court would consider that it's factually
dissimilar to this case and be more prejudicial
than probative, too remote in time, no injury and
factually dissimilar.

Therefore, the Court

questions its relevancy.
MS. ANDERSON: Can I have just a moment?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. TAYLOR: We have one more proffer
apparently in the correspondence.
MS. ANDERSON: The other witness that we
probably should proffer is Becky Roman.

Becky

Roman is Chris Lowe and Tom Lowe's adoptive
mother.
I believe that Mrs. Roman would testify
that Chris lived with her for a period of time

1610

initially right after Faith was born.

I believe

that there would be testimony as to Chris'
parenting skills when Faith was a young infant.
Mrs. Roman and her husband reported Chris for
neglect to DFS, and I believe she would testify
regarding those incidents.
We've also presented the Court yesterday
with a letter that's been marked as Defense
Exhibit 20.

Ms. Roman would authenticate that

letter as having been received, and believing it to
be from Christy Barney.
MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor

—

THE COURT: Well, there are two
then.

issues,

Let's go first to some indication as it

relates to her parenting skills and the fact that
she was reported to DFS.
MR. TAYLOR: With regard to Becky Roman's
observations of Christy and Faith, and the
interaction and what her parenting skills, I think
that's relevant.

I'm not going to object to that.

MS. ANDERSON: Naturally, Mrs. Roman is
also aware of the incidence with Tom.

She's the

mother of these two people.
THE COURT: I would not anticipate -- I
would rule the same as it relates to Becky Roman
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1

foundation and that's got to come through.

2

THE COURT: I'll allow testimony regarding

3

parenting skills and interaction, what she viewed

4

as interaction between Christy Barney and Faith

5

Barney.

6

relevant in terms of time, and I think that that

7

would also extend to her reference of Christy

8

Barney, her own adopted daughter, to DFS.

9

believe.

10

I think that's relevant.

That's all admissible.

I think it's

I

It's relevant.

I believe as it relates to this letter,

11

she may testify she received it.

12

basis for its admissibility, but you can get that

13

far with this letter.

14
15

THE COURT: Anything further, then, as it
relates to Ms. Roman?

16
17

MS. ANDERSON: I think that covers it, your
Honor.

18

THE COURT: Very well.

19

1:30.

20

(Noon recess)

21
22

That's not a

Be in recess until

THE COURT: Recalling the case of State of
Utah versus Gerald Blubaugh, Case No. 921400519.

23

Record ought to reflect that the jury is

24

seated, and the defendant is present with counsel

25

and the State is represented.

You may proceed,

«

^

1G17
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1

radio, TV, and newspaper comments about the trial,

2

in addition not have any contact with counsel or

3

with any of the witnesses or the parties involved*

4

With that, I'll excuse you and we'll address these

5

legal matters, then bring you back in just a

6

moment.

7

(Jury excused)

81

THE COURT: You may be seated.

9

you'll restate your objection on the record and

10

then have Mr. Musselman

11
12

Counsel if

you may respond to that.

MR. TAYLOR: I am presuming, and Counsel,
correct me if I'm wrong

13

—

THE COURT: Perhaps we ought to have a

14

proffer as it relates to what the expected

15

testimony might be, and then we can better address

16

it from that perspective, Counselor.

17

MR. MUSSELMAN: Certainly, your Honor.

As

18

I understand it, what Chris Barney would testify to

19

is that the feeling she had at 8 a.m. on the 5th of

20

August is very similar to a feeling she had at

21

about age 13 or so in her life, upon which occasion

22

she came to or woke up or whatever the terminology

23

is, was in the process of cornering I think her

24

brother in the house, who was a year or so older

25

than her.

She had a butcher knife in her hand.

• wV ^
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1

She had no idea how she got there.

Had no idea

2

why, how the butcher knife got in her hand.

3

idea why she would be doing what she was doing.

Had no

4

The feeling upon gaining consciousness in

5

that context was very, very similar to the feeling

6

she had when gaining consciousness at 8 o'clock in

7

the morning on August 5.

8
9

MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, I think Counsel
can ask her if the feeling corresponded with a

10

feeling of dread, a feeling of fear, a feeling of

11

regret.

12

distant in time, distant in fact, and to try and

13

draw that conclusion is so speculative and is so

14

distant

15

prejudicial than it would be probative.

16

But the incident with her brother is

in

time

as

to

render it

far

more

MR. MUSSELMAN: Your Honor, I felt that the

17

Court's ruling this morning was that the material

18

as to these prior acts was admissible on the

19

grounds that you indicated in your ruling.

20

THE COURT: Well, I found them to be

21

inadmissible, except for they may be relied upon by

22

the expert involved, and that beyond that I thought

23

my ruling, if I can turn to it, is that I found

24

specifically that they were too remote in time.

25

They were more prejudicial than probative.

-^

They

1U.D

934
were factually dissimilar.

Now, you're saying that

the feeling was similar.
MR. MUSSELMAN: That the feeling upon the
waking up or coming to is similar, is what her
testimony I think already has been.
THE COURT: And they were not with a child
or anyone under those circumstances.

I think

you're entitled to inquire whether they are
consistent with feelings she may have had coming
out of a memory lapse when she was 12 years old,
but as to the details of that, I don't believe
that's admissible.
MR. MUSSELMAN: Without going into any of
the details, Judge, are we entitled to go as far as
asking her whether she was engaged in a violent
episode when coming to?
THE COURT: I don't think so.

It's too

dissimilar in time and it's too dissimilar in terms
of facts.

The question is, if she has these memory

lapses en a frequent basis or infrequent basis,
certainly there would have been one between age 12
and age 16 on August the 5th of that date.

There's

got to be something that could tie it in closer
than some four year lapse.
MR. MUSSELMAN: I haven't asked her yet,

*
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1

but I think if I asked her we'll find a series of

2

memory lapse throughout her life, between those two

3

periods of time.

4

This is a specific episode that she

5

relates the feeling of coming out of a particular

6

memory lapse doing something that she was shocked

7

to find herself doing on the one occasion.

8

certainly tend to ask her about other memory

9

lapses, and as I understand it, maybe I should ask

10

I

her now --

11

THE COURT: No.

12

MR. MUSSELMAN: -- since the jury is gone.

13

Well, in any event my understanding is that there

14

have been a series of memory lapse events

15

throughout, at least that period of her life

16

between age 13 and the present.

17

THE COURT: Well, and you may confirm

18

whether those are associated with alcohol or

19

whether this one was or whether that one was and

20

variety of things that way.

21

I think that may be probative, but I

22

think it's far too prejudicial to associate some

23

undefined, unarticulated feeling that she may have

24

had on the morning of August the 5th of 1992 with

25

some unarticulated feeling she may have had when

iGc-0

1

she was 12 years old.

21

MR. TAYLOR: Your Honor, in addition, the

3

State is very concerned that she's being asked to

4

characterize or categorize what has happened during

5

the periods of blackout, when by their very nature

6

she doesn't remember.

7
8

MR. MUSSELMAN: Well, I'm not going to ask
her that.

9]

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to rule,

10

Counsel, that they are too disparing in time and

11

factually dissimilar.

12

relative to tne fact that her feelings on that

13

morning were comparable to those at a time when she

14

came out of a blackout, I'll allow that.

15

beyond that I think it's far too prejudicial.

16

more certainly than it is probative.

17

in time.

18

even able to articulate these feelings.

If she has an opinion

MR. MUSSELMAN: All right.

20

THE COURT: That's my ruling.

21

continue.

22

(Short recess taken)

24
25

It's

It's remote

It's factually dissimilar, and she's not

19

23

But

You can

THE COURT: Back on the record, then, on
State of Utah versus Blubaugh, Case No. 921400519.
Before the jury comes back in and is

LKUL/AT€>
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but I think if I ask him he'll tell you that's what
he relies on in cases like that in making his
professional judgment.

He's relying on those as a

part of his overall diagnosis and assessment in
arriving at an opinion as to what she does during
memory blackouts.
THE COURT: Well, this leap is the thing
that concerns me the most, because if I interpret
his testimony correctly and she goes into these
anytime she has stress, and she has significant
stress every single day, and for the vast majority
of that time under those circumstances she is not
violent in any way, then the inference —
that's the question.

I guess

Whether he can legitimately

testify under those circumstances that she has more
propensity for violence under those circumstances
or not.
MR. MUSSELMAN: The point is it's opinion
evidence.

He's an expert.

He has an opinion.

We

might disagree with it.
THE COURT: His credentials have been
stipulated to.

His

procedures

appear

to

be

sound to the Court in arriving at that, and I think
he

can

testify

as

to

his

psychogenetic amnesia disorder.

diagnosis

of

the

I'll not allow him

to do so to a yet unpublished unrecognized volume
which is still in the critique and review stage, or
any disorder that's not contained within that
recognized presently.
I guess, Counsel, I think it's relevant
that he can testify respecting issues of memory
blackout

I think it comes at issue by virtue of

the fact that she testifies that in close proximity
to the times that the injuries may have occurred to
the child that she has many blackouts.
You may voir dire as it relates to the
issue ultimately of how he reaches any conclusion
respecting the propensity for violence.
MR. TAYLOR: I can't do that without
bringing up the incidents that we have -THE COURT: I know.

I don't want any

specific incidents to come before this jury that
would be removed by virtue of considerable amount
of time, and which have been restricted throughout
the course of this trial, finding that they're are
far more prejudicial than probative.
MR. TAYLOR: Let me state, your Honor, and
again Counsel may wish to present this through the
witness and I can understand that.

But the State

is willing to stipulate that Dr. Howell has

iV&7

1

1

examined her.

2

psychologist, and that he has concluded that there

3

is a

4

psychological ttate that causes her to have loss of

5

memory related to stressful events, which could

6

include times wnen she is violent.

basis

That he's a licensed and reputable

for

a

that

she

has a

THE COURT: What's wrong with that

7
8

stipulation, Counsel?

9

in, isn't it?

10

conclusion

That's about all you can get

MR. MUSSELMAN: fcell, I suppose it is, your

11

Honor, and certainly we're interested in saving

12

time if we can stipulate to qualifications and

13

that, but I do think that the opinion evidence and

14

the methodology of arriving at it is critical, and

15

I think the jury ought to hear and viev the witness

16

as to that so we can assess his demeanor as well,

17

in deciding what weight to give it.

18

MR. TAYLOR: Although if it's stipulated

19

they're told to accept it.

What I'm concerned

20

about is the implication, which is falacious, that

21

because of the diagnosis or the condition that I

22

just described, it necessarily follows that she was

23

violent —

24

morning of August 5th, and B) she was violent

25

during that blackout.

that A) she had a blackout on the

That does not follow from

17CS

1

1 that conclus.ion or that diagnosis.
THE COURT: I don't think it does #

I

Counselor.
MR. MUSSELMAN: I don't think he can

1

testify that it necessarily follows, but once again
as I say, the opinion that he gives as to the
diagnosis and as to the

—

THE COURT: He can give that.
MR. MUSSELMAN: -- and as to what that
diagnosis entails, what his methodology e ntailed in
arriving at :Lt, and explaining what that means, I
think the jury ought to see and hear the witness to
assess the wait to give it.
MR. TAYLOR: If it's limited to that and
I'm entitled to cross to point out the fa llacy of
that conclus:Lon, I suppose that's okay.
THE COURT: I think that's suffic ient
direction to both counsel.

Let's call th e jury.

Are there any other preliminary matters?
MR. MUSSELMAN: I think we need a bout a
five-minute recess
(Short recess)
MR. TAYLOR: We need to bring Ms. Barney
out.
(Jury returns to court room)
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ADDENDUM F
Rules 4 01 and 4 03, Utah Rules of Evidence
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commission of crime similar to that presently
charged, 50 A L R 4th 1049.
Products liability: admissibility of evidence
of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th
1186.
Thermographic tests: admissibility of test results in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th
1105.
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination
lineups, 63 A.L.R.4th 143.
Products liability: admissibility of experi-

u • iisctrixsE*
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mental or test evidence to disprove defect in
motor vehMe, 64 A.L R 4th 125.
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence
of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary bloodstains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588.
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-related
offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal
fluids, 75 A.L.R.4th 897.
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or
enhanced testimony, 77 A.L R.4th 927.
Admissibility of DNA identification evidence, 84 A L.R4th 313.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Advisory Committee No!/-, — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantia
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(1971) except that "surprise" is not included as
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The
change in language is not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be within the concept of
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402
{Rule 403). See also Advisory Committee Note
to Federal Rule 403 indicating that ft continuance in most instances would ; * * *n •? appropriate method of dealing with "surprise.*
See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric

testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and
viola* ion of duo process). See the following
I'IVHI- *aes t<» •» same effect. Terry v. Zions
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah
1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260 (Utah
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah
1982).
Compiler** Notes. — The bracketed reference to "Rule 403** in the Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference.
Cross-References. — Admissibility of evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Balancing t e s t
Bias.
Circumstantial evidence.
Credibility of witness.
Cumulative evidence.
Determination of admissibility.
Expert testimony.
Film of murder scene.
Guilty plea.
Harmless error.
Impeachment of witness.
Inflammatory evidence.
Offensive remarks.
Other offenses.
Photographic evidence.
Prior convictions.
—Impeachment.
Psychiatric history and drug abuse.
Scientific evidence.
Standard of review.
Tape recordings.
—Defendant's admissions.
—Videotapes in pornography trial.
Unfairly prejudicial.
Victim's testimony.
Cited.
Balancing test.
The balancing test of this rule excludes matter of scant or cumulative probative force,,
dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prej-

udicial effect. State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Bias.
The right to cross-examine regarding bias is
limited by this rule. State v. Hackford, 737
P.2d 200 (Utah 1987).
Circumstantial evidence.
rirnjraatantial evidence, although relevant,
ttiHv -vertheless be excluded if the i
<«
of the evidence i s more t h a n count
>d
by its disadvantageous effects in c**«.
he
issues before the jury, or in creating an undue
prejudice in excess of its legitimate probative
weight. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst.,
605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other
grounds, McFarland v. S k a g g s Cos., Inc., 678
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).
Credibility of witness.
This rule is not to be used to allow the trial
judge to substitute his assessment of the credibility of testimony for that of the jury by excluding testimony simply because he does not
find it credible. State v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 1036,108 S.
Ct. 1597, 99 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1988).
Cumulative evidence.
While there may have been little reason to
admit into evidence transcripts of recorded
conversations between the defendant and a
government informant because the evidence
was cumulative, their admission was not preju-

dicial because the transcripts merely repeated
the informant's in-court testimony. State v.
Knowles, 709 P 2d 311 (Utah 1985).
Determination of admissibility.
Although the relevancy of proffered evidence
is crucial, the probative value of the evidence,
standing alone, does not determine its admissibility. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst.,
605 P 2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).
At defendant's trial for forging an endorsement on a check, where actual forgery had
been committed by comf ion, blank checks
found in defendant's car *tre admissible as evidence to support an inference of defendant's
knowledge of the fraud and intentional participation in the forgery; the probative value of
the blank checks was not substantially outweighed by their potential prejudicial effect.
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 >U**h 1982).
In a drug product liability action there was
no error in admitting inserts contained in drug
packages, containing warnings of possible side
effects, where the jury verdict finding negligence was general, where the inserts had a
minor role as cumulative evidence, and where
the inserts were specifically admitted only for
the purpose of proving defect under strict liability. Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb As
Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984).
Where in a trial for murder, robbery, and
theft, evidence of the defendant's probation violation and the theft of a wallet established the
defendant's motive and identity, which were
critical facts in a case that was built primarily
on circumstantial evidence, the evidence was
highly probative and outweighed the risk of
undue prejudice. Therefore, there was no abuse
of the trial court's discretion in not excluding
the evidence. State v. Shaffer, 725 P 2d 1301
(Utah 1986).
Police department letter revealing the outcome of an internal investigation of a police
officer was admissible, where the relevance of
the letter outweighed the policy arguments
against admission *»»' *««v danger of unfair
prejudice, particult
light of the city's
ability to request a '
q; instruction and to
present rebuttal testm *my. Meyers v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 747 P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
The admissibility of character evidence of a
victim's prior sexual behavior should be determined by the trial judge upon consideration of
various factors, including (a) relevancy and
probative value; (b) prejudicial effect; (c) confusion of the issues and undue consumption of
time; and (d) substantial justice. State v.
Moton, 749 P.2d 639 (Utah 1988).
Although trial courts should seriously consider offers to stipulate in deciding whether to
admit or exclude evidence pursuant to this
rule, such an offer is only one factor that plays
into the balancing process. State v. Bishop, 753
P 2d 439 (Utah 1988).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of a murder victim's hearsay
statement that defendant had recently threatened to kill her, where the victim's state of

mind was put directly into issue by defendant's
testimony, and the hearsay statement was
highly probative on that issue. State v. Auble,
754 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988).
Even under circumstances where evidence of
specific instances of defendant's conduct are allowed under the rules, the trial court should
analyze thip testimony under this rule. A careful weighing of the relevance and probative
value of such evidence should be made and a
balance struck between the need for its introduction and the prejudicial effect the testimony
may have before such evidence is received.
State v. Lenaburg. 781 P.2d 432 (Utah 1989).
Expert testimony.
In prosecution for aggravated sexual assault,
testimony of expert in forensic pathology, as to
whether victim sustained bodily injury creating a substantial risk of death, was properly
admitted and did not create a substantial danger of confusing the issues and misleading the
jury. State v. King, 604 P.2d 923 (Utah 1979).
In a prosecution for sexually abusing a child,
the judge's decision to exclude relevant expert
testimony about the behavioral and personality characteristics of a "typical" child sexual
offender was not arbitrary or irrational, since
the tendency of such evidence to confuse the
issues or mislead the jury outweighed its probative value. State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350
(Utah 1985).
Expert testimony of medical examiner and
investigator that the nature of victim's wounds
was more consistent with homicide than with
suicide was not plain *rror and did not violate
this rule, Rule 40<*
;)e 702. State v. Quas,
837 P.2d 565 (U*
* App. 1992).
Film of murder scene.
Trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
allowing the jury to view a film of the murder
scene since it did not attempt to reenact the
crime and was not inflammatory or prejudicial
to the defendant. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261
(Utah 1980).
Guilty plea.
Trial court abused its discretion in excluding
defendant's guilty plea to a criminal charge
from admission at a subsequent civil trial
where plaintiffs wished to have the plea admitted as a declaration against interest, the facts
and circumstances surrounding the criminal
charge were identical to the facts in the civil
case, and no substantial time or confusion
would have been added to the civil trial by reason of admission of the guilty plea. Dixon v.
Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).
Because of the defendant's and the victim's
conflicting testimony on whether the defendant's intent was to rob the victim or merely to
secure payment of money the defendant believed he was owed, the testimony concerning a
prior robbery to which the defendant pled
guilty, although clearly prejudicial to the defendant, was extremely probative of the defendant's intent during this incident. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in weighing
these factors and determining that the probative value of the earlier guilty plea substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect. State
v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Subdivision (b) is comparable in substance to
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Utah
law is believed to generally follow the position
taken by the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974)
and the provisions of Article III as originally

promulgated by the United States Supreme
Court. See Presumptions in Utah: A Search for
Certainty, 5 Utah L. Rev. 196 (1956).
Cross-References. — Criminal proceedings, presumption of fact in, § 76-1-503.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Presumption not raised.
Presumption upheld.
Presumption not raised.
Payment of portion of profits to defendant as
partial reimbursement for expenditures of defendant in connection with business premises
did not raise presumption of a partnership, and
n
l o i n h f l UIOB
ronmrixl to
tn meet
moot his
hio burden
Hut-Hart of
nf
plaintiff
was required
proof without aid of presumption. Koesling v.
Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975).

Presumption upheld.
Where mother executed will and trust instrument, and it was later found that the will
had been executed as a result of undue influence, there was a prima facie presumption of
continued undue influence with respect to an
a n e ged subsequent ratification of the trust,
Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah
*
1983).
r

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 75.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§§ 159 to 1&5, 167.
C.J.S. — 31A CJ.S. Evidenceft119.
A.L.R. — Effect of presumption as evidence
or upon burden of proof where controverting
evidence is introduced. 6 A.L R.3d 19.
Refusal of defendant m pubhc figure l.bel
case to identify claimed sources as raising presumption
against existence of source, 19
ALR4th 919
Presumptions and evidence respecting iden-

tification of land on which property taxes were
paid to establish adverse possession, 36
A.L R 4th 843.
Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in case of
multiple, nonmedical defendants—modern sta£Ug 59 A L R 4th 201
Medical malpractice: presumption or infere n c e f r o m f a j | u r e rf h
i t a , o r 6oclm to
^ ^ ^ ^ 6 9 A X R " 4th
d u c e re,evant
Q
906.^
ey
Numbers. — Criminal Law •» 305,
326
» Evidence «» 85 et seq.

Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and
proceedings.
In civil action.H and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law.
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of
this rule is token from Rule 302, Uniform
Rules of Evidence (1974). Presumptions in

criminal cases are not treated in this rule. See
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-503 (1953)
or any subsequent revision of that section.

ARTICLE IV.
RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS.
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
'*!?<>)«'vnnt evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence oi any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable
in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a tendency to

prove or disprove the existence of any "material fact." Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" accords with the application given to
former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court,
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Effect of remoteness.
Cited.
Effect of remoteness.
Remoteness usually goestothe weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314

(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds,
McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298
< u t a h 1984 >
Cited in State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah
1986); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah
1986); Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp., 747
P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Fisher ex ret

Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App.
1988); Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317
(Utah Ct. App.
ADD. 1988);
1988): St-t*
W„^K„„ 765
•?«*
State „v. Worthen,
P.2d 839 (Utah 1988); State v. Maurer, 770
P.2d 981 (Utah 1989); State, In re R.D.S., 777

P.2d 532 (Utah Ct App 1989) WhitPh^H v
American Motor* SaieT Co^^ O8U^1 rPZ2d
920
d yzu
/in^u * « r ^ ^ .
~ ^
(Utah 1990); State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Larsen, 828 P 2d
487 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review
Utah Rules of Evi- Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78.
L. Rev. 839.
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974) except that priortothe word
"statute" the words "Constitution of the United
States" have been added.

Compiler's Note*. — The Utah rule also
adds the words "or the Constitution of the state
of Utah"toRule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALY8I8

Discretion of court.
Effect of remoteness.
Irrelevant evidence.
Probability evidence.
Scientific evidence.
Standard of review.
Cited.
Discretion of court.
The trial court is given considerable discretion in deciding whether or not evidence submitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethera, 552
P2d 1286 (Utah 1976).
While relevant evidence is generally admissible, a trial court has broad discretiontodetermine whether proffered evidence is relevant, and the appellate court will find error in
a relevancy ruling only if the trial court hss
•bused its discretion. State v. Harrison, 80a
P 2d 769 (Utah Ct. App), cert, denied, 817 P.2d
327 (Utah 1991).
Effect of remoteness.
Remoteness usually goestothe weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
Zions
Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314
(
ii^ h 1 9 7 9 ) ' o v e r r u , «d on other grounds,
McFarland v. Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298
<Utah 1984).
Irrelevant evidence.
Testimony astoimpulsiveness of another
Participant in the crime had no bearing on defendant's guilt or innocence and was properly
excluded as not relevanttodefendant's particiCOLLATERAL
Utah Law Review. — United States v.
"owning: Novel Scientific Evidence and the
"ejection of Frye, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839.
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA
iS; In . g: U t a h Standards for Admissibility,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 717.

pation in the crime. State v. Stephens, 667
P.2d 586 (Utah 1983).
Probability evidence.
Courts have routinely excluded probability
evidence when the evidence invites the jury to
focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical
conclusion rather thantoanalyze the evidence
before it and decide where truth lies. State v.
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986).
Scientific evidence.
The Frye test (that scientific tests still in the
experimental stages should not be admitted in
evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced
from a well recognized scientific principle or
discovery is admissible if the scientific principle is sufficiently established) is a valid test,
though not necessarily an exclusive test, for
rictermining when scientific evidence is sufficiently reliabletobe admitted and is not inconsistent with Rules 402, 403, and 702 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. KoiTord v. Flora, 744
P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987).
Standard of review.
The judgment of the trial court admitting or
excluding evidence will not be reversed unless
it is shown that the discretion exercised
therein has been abused. Terry v. Zions Coop.
Mercantile Inst, 605 P 2d 314 (Utah 1979),
overruled on other grounds, McFarland v.
Skaggs Cos., Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).
Cited in State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).
REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Admissibility of voice stress evaluation test results or of statements made during
test, 47 A.L.R.4th 1202.
Admissibility and weight of evidence of prior
misidentification of accused in connection with
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ADDENDUM G
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Defendant's
Motion to Suppress
Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Ruling on Defendant's Motion in Limine and Defendant's
Motion to Quash and Motion to Dismiss
Order on Defendant's Motion in Limine, Motion to Quash
and Motion to Dismiss
Record, pp. 232, 220-19
Trial Transcript, pp. 857-64
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
Case No. 921400519 FS

GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH,
Defendant(s)•

Judge Lynn W. Davis

This matter came before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to
Suppress*

The Court has issued its Ruling dated May 18, 1993.

Being fully advised in the premises the Court makes and enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On August 5, 1992, Dee Rosenbaum, Chief of the Spanish

Fork Police Department, received a call to go to the apartment
shared by Defendant, Gerald Gene Blubaugh, and co-Defendant,
Christy Barney, to investigate a possible non-accidental injury to
the victim, Faith Barney.
2. When Chief Rosenbaum arrived at Defendant's residence the
Defendant was in his car and leaving for the hospital.
3. Chief Rosenbaum was driving an unmarked automobile and was
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in plain clothes. The Chief was not displaying a badge nor was he
armed.
4. The Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, recognized Chief Rosenbaum
and stopped to talk to him.
5.

After a brief conversation outside the apartment Chief

Rosenbaum asked for permission to enter the home, view the crib,
and take the crib sheet.
6.

Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, was advised

that Chief

Rosenbaum's purpose in seizing the sheet was to preserve evidence
in the event fluids on the sheet needed to be analyzed.
7. The Defendant agreed to the entry of Chief Rosenbaum into
his home and the seizure of the sheet.
8. Chief Rosenbaum did not claim to have authority to search
the apartment absent consent.
9. The extent of Chief Rosenbaum's intrusion into the home on
this first instance was to speak to Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh,
view the crib, and seize the crib sheet.
10.

Chief Rosenbaum did not display any show of force.

11. The Defendant cooperated with Chief Rosenbaum and freely
and voluntarily gave the Chief consent to enter the home, view the
crib and take the sheet.
12. Chief Rosenbaum spoke to the Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh,
and co-Defendant, Christy Barney, again at the hospital in Payson
on the morning of August 5, 1992. After leaving the hospital all
three agreed to meet again at the Blubaugh apartment.
13.

When Chief Rosenbaum arrived at the apartment he was
2

.-.-.
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invited inside.
14.

Chief Rosenbaum had brought a video camera with him and

asked for permission to videotape the apartment.
15.

Both Christy Barney and Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh,

agreed to have the apartment videotaped.
16.

Chief Rosenbaum panned around the apartment and focused

briefly on the crib and on some prescriptions for the child.
17. The Defendants cooperated with Chief Rosenbaum's efforts
by holding up prescriptions and showing him through the apartment.
18.

Chief Rosenbaum did not make a claim of authority to

search the apartment absent a warrant or a consent.
19.

Chief Rosenbaum did not make any exhibition of force.

20. Chief Rosenbaum merely requested permission to videotape
the apartment and limited his search to the scope of his request.
21.

Chief Rosenbaum did not act deceptively.

22.

Chief Rosenbaum did not tell the Defendant, Gerald Gene

Blubaugh, that he had the right to refuse to have the apartment
videotaped.
23.

Co-Defendant, Christy Barney, voluntarily consented to

the videotaping of the home.
24.

The meeting was not confrontational or accusatory.

25. The focus of the interviews conducted by Chief Rosenbaum
of Gerald Gene Blubaugh on August 5, 1992, at the Defendant's
apartment was not on the Defendant but on the cause of the victim's
injury in an attempt to discover who the caretakers of the child

3

were for the purpose of preserving evidence.
26.

The questions were not directed at any specific person.

27.

There was no objective indicia of arrest, no handcuffs

were visible, no threat of arrest was made, and no uniformed
officers were present.
28.

The length of both interviews was short in duration and

Chief Rosenbaum did not use coercive or compulsive strategy.
29 •

The interview at Payson Hospital with both Defendants

occurred in the public lobby area of the emergency room.
30.

Other persons, including the best friend of Christy

Barney, were present.
31.

Hospital patrons were coming and going.

32. The questions asked were generic and were not coercive in
nature and were not directed to one specific Defendant.
33. The Defendants and Chief Rosenbaum mutually agreed to the
next meeting at the home after leaving the hospital.
34.

Chief Rosenbaum arrived at the home in Spanish Fork

before the Defendants.
35. The Defendants were not escorted home and had stopped for
sodas on the way home suggesting that they were not compelled to
arrive at the home at any particular time or to conduct an
interview.
36.

Co-Defendant Barney stated that she never felt under

arrest and freely assisted Chief Rosenbaum in the interview and
taking the video.
37. Neither Defendant was in custody at any time on August 5f

4

1992, for purposes of Miranda warnings.
38. On August 14, 1992, the Defendant, Gerald Gene Blubaugh,
was interviewed by Spanish Fork Police Officers at the Spanish Fork
Police Department.
39.

The interview occurred at the Spanish Fork Police

Department in the evening.
40. Officer Steve Adams went to the Defendant's apartment and
asked the Defendant if he would come to the police department to be
questioned.
41.
42.

Officer Adams was clothed in a suit and tie.
Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, agreed to accompany the

officer and went to the station in the officer's car.
43.

Blubaugh's car had broken down and was upon blocks.

44.

Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, was not placed under arrest

and was not handcuffed.
45. The police station was a converted IHC Instacare facility
(doctors office) which did not have the appearance of a jail or
holding cell.
46.

Once at the station the Defendant was taken to an

interview room.
47.

Officer Adams left and Lt. Carl Johnston entered the

interview room.
48.
49.

Lt. Johnston was also in a suit and tie.
No

approximately

questions

were

asked

of

the

Defendant

until

ten minutes later when Officer Adams returned.

Officer Johnston recited Miranda warnings to the Defendant before

5

any further questioning.
50. Defendant, Gerald Blubaugh, agreed to speak with officers
and was questioned for approximately an hour.
51 •

After the initial questioning the tape recorder was

turned on and Defendant Blubaugh was again given his Miranda
rights.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court makes and enters
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Defendant voluntarily consented to the seizure of the
crib sheet on August 5, 1992.
2.

The Defendant, as well as the co-Defendant, voluntarily

consented to the videotaping of the apartment on August 5, 1992.
3.

The Defendant was not in custody for purpose of Miranda

warnings

during

the August

5, 1992, interviews

with

Chief

Rosenbaum.
4. Any statements made by the Defendant on August 14, 1992,
at the Spanish Fork Police Department were made following adequate
^<

Miranda warnings.
DATED this

& *

^"TT"""

day of May, 1993.
BY THE COURT/:

'LYNN W. DAVIS \\o>. >?DISTRICT JUDGE v :X.' ">

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
6

40

Findgings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Defendant's Motion to
Suppress were faxed and mailed this &1
day of May, 1993, to:
Linda Anderson, Attorney for Defendant, 2230 North University
Parkway, Suite 9-F, Provo, Utah, 84604; fax no. 801-375-0704, and
John Musselman, Attorney for Defendant, 3507 North University
Avenue, Suite 370, Provo, Utah, 84604; fax no. 801-375-7686.

7

FILED
Fourth Jiui,.:,z- '+-;. >• Cwt of
CTHwk^MilH.Cierk
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT QO j( J

Deputy

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

Case No. 921400519
V.

Judge Lynn W. Davis
GERALD G. BLUBAUGH,

j

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Su^:.~~. The Court
has reviewed the memoranda of counsel, took testimony, entertained argument of counsel,
and being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following:
RULING
1.

The defendant voluntarily consented to the seizure of the crib sheet.

2.

The defendant as well as the co-defendant voluntarily consented to the video
taping of the apartment.

3.

The defendant was not in custody for purpose of Miranda during the August 5,
1992 interviews with Chief Rosenbaum.

4.

Assuming without deciding that the defendant was in custody while at the
Spanish Fork Police Station, the defendant received adequate Miranda
warnings during the August 14, 1992 interrogation.
DISCUSSION

L

VOLUNTARY CONSENT

The defendant requests that this Court suppress certain evidence seized without a

warrant from the defendant's home; namely, a crib sheet and a video-tape of the defendant's
apartment made by police on August 5, 1992. Defendant argues that this evidence should be
suppressed because it was obtained without a warrant and there is no valid exception to the
warrant requirement. The defendant challenges the voluntariness of the consent given. The
defendant argues that although he consented, he subjectively felt that he could not refuse
consent because of Chief Rosenbaum's position as chief of police. Consequently, the
defendant argues that since he did not think that he could refuse, that his consent was not
voluntary.
Voluntary consent is an established exception to the warrant requirement.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 687
(Utah 1990); State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah App. 1991). In order for a court to
admit evidence seized without a warrant the state must prove that: (1) the consent was
voluntary in fact; and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of a prior
illegality. Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 688. Since the defendant has not alleged any prior illegality,
the second prong is not at issue.
The determination of voluntariness is an inherently fact sensitive inquiry and requires
inquiry into the totality of the circumstances. State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 467 (Utah App.
1991); State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65,
82 (Utah App. 1990). The state must meet the following standard:
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was

2

"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently given;" (2) the
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express
or implied; and (3) the court indulge every reasonable presumption against the
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing
evidence that such rights were waived.
791 P.2d 880, 887-88 (quoting United States v. Abbott. 546 F.2d 883, 885 i
.._ .

HI 1 "." Il

;

-I "

The Utah Suprenn ft iiiiirt has listed some factors which trial courts can take into
consideration '*hi'i> delenn iinig v1!'.*!!1/1! '.oi'vti, w.t!"i

VP'M

J

,', Fit |III||!,|!||II

"I1 '' *tlinv |'|«," i

claim of authority to search by the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition of torce- by tne
officers; (3) a mere request to search; (4) cooperation by the u.-nt'i iuJ l,
deception or trick on the part of the officer," State v. Whittenback. 621 P.lti 103 . •>' •
(Uun 1980); Carter. Si? P ?;? at 467-68.
defen-

A

™fher factor to be considered is whein- ~.e
Whittenback. 621 P.2d at 106, But this last

:s not deir
.il Hi-!1 figiii Li . J . . .

* u . _ e is not required to prove that the defendant knew
'. I.

i I I..II

I , M 7. Whittc,»baik. f>'"1 I1 ?.l M iltf. J l a r t o ,

II. I

812 P,2d at 468; Bobo. 803 P.2d at 1272.
w*w *u-vi. -^t>M standard to ^uidajin, lln,
seizure issues raised by defendant concerning the crib sheet and the video-taping of the
apartment.
; : leizure of the Crib Sheet,
On August 5, 1992, Dee Rosenbaum, chief of the Spanish Fork Police Department,
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received a call to go to the apartment shared by the defendant and Christy Barney to
investigate a possible "non-accidental" injury to the victim, Faith Barney, When Chief
Rosenbaum arrived at the defendant's residence, the defendant was in his car and leaving for
the hospital. Chief Rosenbaum was driving an unmarked automobile and was in plain
clothes. He was not displaying a badge, nor was he wearing a gun. The defendant
recognized Chief Rosenbaum and stopped to talk to him. Chief Rosenbaum identified
himself.
After a brief conversation outside the apartment, the officer asked for permission to
enter the home, view the crib, and take the crib sheet. Chief Rosenbaum stated that his
purpose in seizing the sheet was to preserve evidence in the event the fluids on the sheet
needed to be analyzed. The defendant was advised of these purposes. The defendant also
agreed to the entry of Chief Rosenbaum into his home and the seizure of the sheet. Chief
Rosenbaum did not document or record any statements of the defendant.
The Court makes the following findings regarding the facts surrounding the seizure of
the crib sheets: The officer asked specifically for permission to look at the crib and take the
crib sheet; the officer limited the scope of his search and seizure to the specific items he
requested to see and seize; the officer did not claim to have authority to search the apartment
absent consent; the officer did not display any show of force, and there was no evidence of
any coercion. Chief Rosenbaum did not wear a gun and was not in uniform; the officer
merely requested consent to view the crib and take the sheet; the defendant cooperated with

4

tint i Hi In H ill!

fTiuTT did not attempt to deceive the defendant regarding his purpose for 'the

search; the defendant was not in custody; the officer did not tell the d e f e n c e that he had a
Th^rp k no pvidp.ncf thnt the discussion was confrontational or
accusatory in nature
"ill!!, "( Vim "ili'lfMiiiiii ,„, iillni lUiLsideiliig ll'ii loliih'v ", "I1" 'l"1'"1"1 ,l|pstnnre.sl that the
LwxwA4v*jjit voluntarily consented to the request to view
also determines that the del aidant's conser,

-

1

intelligently given/
P
:

*

Video-taping of Apartment
ftiubaugh

and Christy Barney agreed to meet with Chief

Rosenbaum at 11 V) a r- on August i , 1992. 'Ihe meeting was held at their apartment. •
When Clue) Kusefihumn iiinvnl .il Hit1, apart rnrril, lif1" w m in .ilnl ni'.irlr1

Chief Rosenbaum

had brought a video camera with him and asked for permission to video-tape the apartment.
11 , 11 (" 1111: * I, y Barney and . . „.. ~~

-.. ~ c

fc

panned around the apartment and focused briefly M th*
the child. The defendants cooperated

.v.^osenDaun

,

e prescriptions for

..;

prescriptions. , and showing him through the apanment.
The Court makes the following factual findings regarding the video-taping of the
authority to search the apartment absent a
warrant or consent; (2) there was no exhibition of force; (3) the officer merely requested

5
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permission to video-tape the apartment and limited his search to the scope of his request; (4)
the defendant and Christy Barney, the co-defendant, cooperated and assisted the officer's
video-taping; (5) the officer did not act deceptively; (6) the officer did not tell defendant that
he had the right to refuse; (7) Christy Barney also voluntarily consented the video-taping of
the home. The meeting was not confrontational nor accusatory. Viewing the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the consent to video-tape the apartment, the Court determines that
the defendant's consent was voluntary, "unequivocal and specific," and "freely and
intelligently given."
H.

MIRANDA CONSIDERATIONS

The defendant argues that the state failed to provide the defendant with a Miranda
warning prior to interrogating him on three occasions. There is no dispute before this Court
that the defendant was questioned on at least three occasions. Chief Rosenbaum interviewed
the defendant twice at his apartment on August 5, 1992. And on August 14, 1992, two
officers of the Spanish Fork Police interviewed defendant at the police station.
The protection afforded in Miranda are triggered only when the defendant is subject
to custodial interrogation. State v. Mirquet. 844 P.2d 995 (Utah App. 1992). The United
States Supreme Court has defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The
Court has also stated that the "ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or

6

restrain! of freedom in mo • ninii

nil iln depree associated with formal arrest." California

v. Beheler. 465 U . S . 1121, 1125 (1983). The inquiry is objective: whether a reasonable
•,t defendain'v p s||i»11111 w

i'i k h

' •'"" ' her freedom, w as. curtailed to a degree

— w ~ ed with a formal arrest. State v. Mirquet. 844 P.2d at 999.
The court, ul appi ill1 III w identified five latUus lo lit i misideicil IIII i

g

the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda: (1) the site of 'the
interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether

\

i nil i h\ of .iiTtM wi iii i in fi M ul, .annul («i) the length and form of interrogation; (5) the presence
of coercive or compulsive strategy on the officer part, ,M
A.

August 5th. 1992.

The defendant seeks to have any incriminating statements made during the two
interviews made on Au^uu V I W al \\i\ aptiilmriil suppressed

Mi I limn! iiiriiih,li

following factual findings with regards to the1 August S, 1992, interviews: The site of the
interviews was defendant's apartment; the locus at tin " iiiiiiiilr'i iews was not on the L„£;.^..t
cause of the child's Injury, discovering who 'the caretakers of the child were, and
preserving evidence; the questions were not directed at any specific person; there were

nrk

, no handcuffs weinr visible, no threat of arrest was made, nu
uniformed officers were present; the officer was invited into the home; the lengths of both
interviews were short in duration; ll > office did III»I i

< «

i i» ipi/i<;ivih. strategy.

The second "interview" at the home occurred after Chief Rosenbaum had a short discussion

7

at the Payson hospital with both defendants. That discussion occurred in the public lobby
area of the emergency room. Others were present, including the best friend of Christy
Barney. Other hospital patrons were coming and going. The questions were generic, were
not coercive in nature and were not directed to one specific defendant. The defendants and
Chief Rosenbaum arranged the next meeting at the home at that time. Chief Rosenbaum
arrived back at the home before the defendants. They were not escorted home and had
stopped for sodas on the way home, suggesting that they were not compelled to arrive at the
home at any particular time or to conduct an interview. Co-Defendant Barney, who shared
the residence, admitted that she never felt under arrest and freely assisted Chief Rosenbaum
in taking the video.
These facts amply support the Court's determination that for purposes of Miranda the
defendant was not in custody. A reasonable person in the defendant's situation would not
consider him or herself in custody or under formal arrest.
&

August 14th. 1992

The facts surrounding the August 14, 1992 interview are significantly different and
are not in dispute with one exception. The relevant undisputed facts are as follows. The
interview occurred at the Spanish Fork Police Station in the evening. Officer Steve Adams
went to the defendant's apartment and asked the defendant if he would come the police
station with him in order to ask him some questions. Officer Adams was clothed in a suit
and tie. Defendant Blubaugh agreed to accompany the officer and went to the station in the

8

officer's car. Blubaugh's car had broken down and was up on blocks. The defendant was
not placed under arrest and was not handcuffal

i i r .JII ilii iiauou, ilir, ildniiLtiii m tis iala;n

to the interview room. Officer Adams left and Lt. Carl Johnson entered the interview room.
*' Tohnson was also in a suit and tie, The Spanish Fork police department at that
in >\ biiilrinic previously usrd as a I.H.C. InstaCare facility. It was not a jail
environment.

^re asked at this time

ASout fen minutes later officer Adams

return

lefendant and the state

m e detenaan. . t ^ . .

ceded to

ask him questions. Defendant alleges that the officers used a "good cop/bad cop" technique
during this part of the interview
interrogation

f

After an hour the officers began tape reooiuing uie

ohnson then recited the Miranda warning for the first time. The

w continued for around another hour.
Johnson recited the
Miranda warning to .\e c-

.

M uestioning

occurred. I lin : officers testified

that they did quest
beginning recording the interview,

recited the Miranda warning again

9
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officers testified that the purpose for not taping the interview at the onset was to focus the
scope of the interview: separating the wheat from the chaff in Officer Johnson's words.
After considering the testimony, the Court finds the testimony of the two officers to
be more credible and finds that the defendant did receive proper Miranda warnings prior to
the interrogation. The Court will not reach the issue of whether the defendant was in
custody during the interrogation at the Spanish Fork Police station because it finds that
proper Miranda warnings were given.
CONCLUSION
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an
Order within 15 days of this decision consistent with the terms of this Ruling and submit it to
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature.
This Ruling has no effect until such Order is signed by the Court.
Dated at Provo, this [& day of _

M&</

. 1993.

BY THE COURT

cc:

Linda Anderson, Esq.
John Musselman, Esq.
Jim Taylor, Esq.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRK I I ( M III I
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
IN LIMINE AND DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTION
TO DISMISS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 921400519
GERALD G. BLUBAUGH,
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court on May 25, 1993 on Defendant's Motion in
Limine and Defendant's Motion to Quash and Motion In I >i\

I In defendant filed

numerous motions on May 1, 1993. The state responded on May 21, 1993. The Court has
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, entertained argument of counsel,
lie l» t ii fully iulviMtl in Hit premises now enters the following:
RULING
1.

Di'lViulaiil'*" "'niiini in lnim inim.hn ||M|i nf uiinjny pin.pIJIJ;1p|1s

imt]

vidtvfape

recordings of photographic depictions of the victim is granted.
Jm •
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drug counseling is granted.
3.

Defendant's motion to limit introduction of evidence of sexual abuse sustained

inflicted by the defendant early in. his life is granted,
4.

Dei i I l l s motion to limit introduction of evidence of attempts by defendant

to restrain the victim through use of a harness is granted.
5.

Defendant's motion to limit introduction of the videotape recording of

defendant's home is denied.
6.

Defendant's motion to limit the introduction of testimony demonstrating

defendant's knowledge of karate is denied.
7.

The Court reserves ruling on defendant's motion to limit the introduction of

evidence of pattern of abuse and battered child syndrome.
8.

Defendant's Motion to Quash the bindover and Motion to Dismiss are denied.
DISCUSSION
I.
MOTION IN LIMINE

The Court grants defendant's Motion in Limine as to the following items: autopsy
photographs, videotaped depiction of victim prior to death, evidence of prior drug use,
evidence of prior sexual abuse suffered by defendant or inflicted by defendant, and evidence
that defendant restrained the victim in a harness. The plaintiff has not opposed limiting the
introduction of the above listed items.
The Court denies defendant's motion with regards to the videotape recording of
defendant's home and evidence of defendant's karate training. The Court finds that this
evidence is relevant and upon the proper foundation is admissible. The Court finds that any
prejudice to the defendant does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the
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pi offered evidence

• •;

The Court reserves ruling on the admissibility of a specific pattern of abuse. The
( omul liiuds Hull1 lliiiii iiviiLltitntf

iiiiiiiy In mi HI; Hi, vjiiiil mil

r u a h l i M i m e i i i nf mi |Mnjxfcr
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foundation.

n
MOTION TO QUASH AND MOTION TO DISMISS
The Court has reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript

li i ;: clei foi tl ic state to

pre \ ra il at prelin lina i ) 1 ica i In :ig tl me state i i in ist present evidence establishing probable cause
under two separate prongs: (1) that a crime has been committed, and (2) that there is

Anderson. 612 P 2d 778, 782-83 (Utah 1980).
The defendant does not content Hut tic suit has lailnl I rin,,

11 •. iLil a u.ii.iL has

been committed. Rather, defendant challenges the probable cause determination underlying
the second prong. Evidence of battered child syndrome alone is not enough to prove that the
defend.ml rommillnl titr plinviv win 1 mch testimony is "not accusatory, but only indicates
the cause of death." State v. Tanner. 675 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah 1983). The defendant argues
nng supn
probable cause that the defendant committed the offense.

order. The Court makes the following findings which support the bindover order: There is

3
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sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant had care and custody of the victim jointly
with Christy Barney. Specifically, the defendant was present in the home the evening prior
to the child's hospitalization. Additionally, there is evidence that the defendant was the first
person to awake the morning of August 5,1992, and alerted Christy Barney to the child's
respiratory problems. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 152, 185.) There is evidence that
the defendant hit the child on more than one occasion. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at
181-182.) There is evidence that the defendant maltreated the child. (Preliminary Hearing
Transcript at 151.) There is evidence that the child was not injured on August 4, 1992, and
that the defendant, along with Ms. Barney, had custody and care of the child at that time.
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 139. )
The State's burden at preliminary hearing is not high. Viewing the evidence
presented as a whole, this Court finds that the evidence presented is sufficient to support the
bindover order. Although mostly circumstantial in nature, the evidence connecting this
defendant to the death of Faith Barney rises to the level of probable cause. Accordingly, the
defendant's Motion to Quash and Motion to Dismiss are hereby denied.
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an
Order within 15 days of this decision consistent with the terms of this Ruling and submit it to
opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature.
This Ruling has no effect until such Order is signed by the Court.

4
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Dated at Provo, this _£_ day oi \Ju/u^- ]yy.4
BY THE COURT

mgjrtjynn W. Davis^
Jim Taylor, Deputy County Attorney
John Musselman, Esq.
Linda Anderson, Esq.
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restrain the victim through use of a harness.
2. The Defendant's motion to limit introduction of videotaped
recording of the Defendant's home on August 5, 1992, is denied.
3. The Defendant's motion to limit introduction of testimony
demonstrating the Defendant's knowledge of karate is denied.
4.

The Court reserves ruling on the Defendant's motion to

limit the introduction of evidence of pattern of abuse and battered
child syndrome until additional foundation has been proffered or
provided to the Court.
5.

The Defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover and to

dismiss the charges in this matter is denied.
DATED this

/3

day of J*SeT 1993.
BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

JOHN MUSSELMAN
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

2
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•hA
LINDA ANDERSON - -.»J
ANDERSON, DREDGE, STRINGER AND BLAKELOCK, P.A.
Attorney for Defendant
2230 No. Univ. Parkway
Suite 9-D
Provo, Ut. 84604
Telephone: (801) 37S-767R
.D. JOHN MUSSELMAN
' '<•" '
Jamestown Square
3507 University Ave, Hanover Bldg
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: .(801) 375-7680
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE O

UTAH

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS AND REQUEST FOR
EVIDENTIARY HEARING

STATE OF UTAH,
I
vs.
GERALD GENE BLUBAUGH,

Crimiiki l lln

Defendant.

Judge Davis

COMES NOW, the Defendant, by and throug*
LINDA ANDERSON and •

ii inn I i

« counsel,

USSELMAN, pursuant to

following Memorandum oi Kint

authorities in *«-,. P w.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Request for Evidentiary
Hearing.

e

or voluntarily went to the location of the third and final
interrogation.
The Defendant was subjected to situations in which he never
felt free to leave and felt compelled to provide incriminating
information to the Spanish Fork Police Department*

In his second

encounter with the Spanish Fork Police Department, Chief Dee
Rosenbaum spoke with the Defendant at his home.

This visit

occurred August 5th, the same day Faith Barney was taken to the
hospital.

The officer arrived at the Defendant's residence

within minutes after he had returned from the hospital.

The

Defendant and the co-Defendant returned to change their clothes
as the life-flight helicopter carried Faith Barney to Primary
Children's Hospital.
The Defendant and Chief Rosenbaum, have known each other for
some time and because of this factor, the Defendant felt he had
no choice but to answer all of the Chief's questions and to allow
Chief Rosenbaum to take the video of his home.

The Defendant was

not told the answers could be used against him and therefore
cannot be assumed to have known that.
If the Defendant had been formally given the option not to
allow Chief Rosenbaum to enter his home, he would have denied
access.

Even though it could be argued that the Defendant did

have an alternative option to deny consent, the Defendant here
did not believe he had any choice. He was not asked a question;
the Chief stated his intentions of coming to see the crib sheet
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on the first visit and his intent to video the residence on the
second.

Due to the fact that he knew Chief Rosenbaum and was

aware of his position of authority he felt compelled to allow the
Chief to proceed.
The Defendant did not feel free to leave.

In fact, he was

not in a situation where he could leave as the interview took
place in his home.

The fact that the Defendant allowed Chief

Rosenbaum into his home does not equate to a voluntariness to
provide inculpatory statements. As asserted in United States v.
Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1387 (7th Cir. 1991), "A person does
not abandon his privacy interest in his home by opening his door
from within to answer a knock."

Although Berkowitz involved a

Fourth Amendment intrusion, that rule applies to the case at hand
in that the Defendant did not voluntarily waive his rights by
allowing Chief Rosenbaum, a person of clear authority, to enter
his residence.
The Defendant had no question in his mind that the
individual at his door was Chief Rosenbaum.

The Defendant wanted

to cooperate with the Chief in any way that would help.

The

Defendant was unsure about the encounters with the Spanish Fork
Police Department, but was not in a position to question the
authority of Chief Rosenbaum.

Nor did the Chief provide an

opportunity for the Defendant to question the Chief's authority.
Further, the police took advantage of a highly emotional and
vulnerable suspect.

A small child for whom he cared deeply was

in critical condition and he was rushing to Primary Children's
14

113

something with the Court briefly.

Maybe we can

just come back and discuss it at a bench
conference, but perhaps we can take it in the
hall.
(Off the record.)
THE COURT:

Going back on the record.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there is
a matter that has arisen, which somehow will
need to be taken, a motion respecting some legal
matters entirely. I'll need to rule on those.
And based upon that ruling, then we'll know the
direction.
So we're going to excuse you briefly now.
And-- I suppose that this will not take a long
time in terms of the arguments-- and invite you
back in in just a few moments. Thank you very
much.
(Whereupon, at 3:36 p.m., the jury was
excused and the following proceedings
continued:)
MR. TAYLOR:

If I may, Your Honor.

I'm going to make a short proffer as to
what our next item of evidence will be, about
which I expect there will be an objection as we
have discussed.

I want to make that proffer so
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1
2

that we can set up the frame work.
Our.next item of evidence, Your Honor, we

3

had intended to play the videotape as we have

4

discussed with sound up. And I believe they have

5

an objection, to which we'll respond.

6

THE COURT:

Mr. Musselman?

7

MR. MUSSELMAN:

Your Honor, the

8

objection i s — w a s previously argued, and the

9

Court has ruled on the admissibility of the

10

videotape.

11

whether it was going to be shown with or without

12

sound.

13

without.

14

I don't think we've ever addressed

Quite frankly, I assumed it would be

We have done research as to admissibility

15

of the video tapes.

16

that research to the Court in the previous

17

arguments.

18

cases, which is in our memorandum.

19

And we have cited some of

The Cloud case being one of those

I don't recall any of the cases speaking to

201

the issue of whether the sound ought or ought

211

not to be up or down.

22

case we researched where the general

23

admissibility of the tape was an issue the video

But I do recall that each

241 was shown to the Court without sound.
251

It's always been my experience when we've
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1

used video tapes-- at least in this district--

2

they're shown without sound.

3

And the logical basis for that is simply

4

that a videotape with sound contains the

5

commentary of the videoer of announcing, "I'm

6

now looking at this" or "I'm now looking at

7

that", or, "Hey, Bill, by the way, will you--"

8

things of that nature. And the sound is not

9

relevant to the proceeding.

10

THE COURT:

How is it prejudicial?

11

MR. MUSSELMAN:

Well, let me think

121 about what that sound contains.
13

THE COURT:

You have an opportunity to

14

cross examine the police chief who took the

15

video, and certainly he would have the

16

opportunity to even make commentary here in open

17

court today under oath regarding the video.

18

if it were played without sound, would there be

And

191 any basis upon which he could not comment as the
20
21

jury is viewing the video?
MR. MUSSELMAN:

Oh, no.

He could

22

certainly be asked questions and comment as the

23

jury views.

241
25

The difference is, as I see it, I cannot
directly cross examine nor can I object to
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1

questions and answers, because there are no

21 questions on the video. There is simply a
3
41
5i

colloquy.
Whereas, if we are showing a sound-less
video and asking questions of the witness, if

61 there's a question I object to, I can state that
7

and the Court can rule.

Furthermore, I can

8

directly cross examine what he says on the stand

91 in a fashion that is not as available in cross
10

examining the videotape by later cross-examining

11

the person on the stand.

12
13
14

THE COURT:

Have you viewed the

videotape?
MR. MUSSELMAN:

I have viewed it.

15

been awhile since I've looked at it.

16

to remember exactly what the sound contains.

17

And my memory is more general.

18

It's

I'm trying

I remember a general monologue of walking

191 around the house and announcing this and that.
20

There is some give and take, as I recall it,

21

between the chief and both Mr. Blubaugh and M s .

22

Barney. Quite frankly, I don't think there's

23

anything said that's especially prejudicial.

24

THE COURT:

Well, that's what I'm

251 attempting to determine.

Is there anything that
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1

you recall from your view of the video that is

21 either objectionable, prejudicial in any form or
3
41

fashion?
MR. MUSSELMAN:

I'm certain that

51 there's no statement on the video where anyone
61 says s o m e — m a k e s some earth-shattering
7j about what happened to this baby.

statement

But on the

81 other hand, because of its nature, of its being
91 more or less a monologue, give and take that
10

cannot be cross examined, I don't think it's

11

relevant, and I think it may also violate the

12| sixth amendment right to confrontation.
13

THE COURT:

If this Court has already

14] determined that the defendant and the
151 co-defendant voluntarily consented to the
16j videotaping of the home doesn't the issue of
171 consent then evaporate the issue of the other?
18

MR. MUSSELMAN:

191

THE COURT:

Consent to the--

Absolute

voluntarily

201

consent to the videotaping of the home in

211

question?

22

MR. MUSSELMAN:

Well, they consented to

23

the videotaping, but I don't think that means

24

they necessarily consented to the admission of

25

the monologue.
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1

THE COURT:

Tell me again in your best

21 articulation what is prejudicial or what is
3

objectionable, counsel.

4

there objectionable, I want to be sure the jury

5

does not see it.

6

that is prejudicial that otherwise would not be

7

admissible, I want to be sure that the jury does

81 not see it.
9

If there's something

If there's something there

Articulate the best you can what is

objectionable and what is prejudicial.

10

MR. MUSSELMAN:

I do not believe there

111

is a specific statement made by either Ms.

12

Barney or Mr. Blubaugh that is particularly

13

objectionable. I do believe that a monologue by

14

the person videoing of describing what he's

15

looking at on the videotape is objectionable,

16

because it is the-- it's an out-of-court

17

statement made by this witness as opposed to the

181 defendant or someone else.

He should make his

19

statements under oath in this courtroom, not

20

under oath and on a videotape.

21
22
23
24

THE COURT:

Does the State wish to

MR. TAYLOR:

First of all, even if

respond?

Chief Rosenbaum were not present, his commentary

25| on the tape I think would be admissible as an
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1

exception to the hearsay rule, because it is a

2

description of conditions then existing and then

31 present. It is an exception to the hearsay rule.
41 But it cannot be hearsay if the declarant is
5

present testifying and available for

61 cross-examinations.
7

It is absolutely not a

violation of the defendant's rights to confront

81 a witness when the declarant is present.
9J

The only people who speak on the video — and

10

we'd really have to play it for Your Honor.

11

It's only about 10 minutes long-- but the only

12

people who speak on it are the defendant, Chief

13

Rosenbaum and Ms. Barney.

And they have not

141 objected to statements of either Ms. Barney or
15
16|

the defendant.
Therefore, we only have the statements of

17

the declarations of the witness who is here and

18

who can be cross examined to any length they

19

wish with regard to what he has said here under

20

oath or what he said on the tape.

21

Now, we'll be happy to put him under oath

22

and ask him if he really meant what he said on

23

the tape.

24

I don't think that's part and parcel of the

25

right to confront and— the right to confront

But I think that's superfluous.
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1

and the right to cross examine. It simply does

2

not violate any of their rights.

3

determined that the statements were not made

4

under oath. And we're not even talking about

5

statements of the defendant.

6

appropriate.

7

THE COURT:

81

MR. MUSSELMAN:

9

We have

We think it's

Anything further?
I've already spoken.

We'll submit it.

10

THE COURT:

I'll allow it. I don't see

11

any articulation on the part of the defense that

12

it's prejudicial and is objectionable under law.

13

The videotape is already ruled to be

141

admissible.

15

determined that defendants voluntarily consented

16

to the videotaping of the home.

17

And this Court has already

A videotaping of a home-- a videotape has

181 both an audio and ^a visual aspect to it.
191

And

I'll overrule your objection, counsel. It may be

201 played to the jury. I'll then inform the-211

(Off the record. )

221

THE COURT:

23

We'll call the jury back

in.

241

(Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the jury

25|

returned, and the following proceedings
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ADDENDUM H
Testimony of Carol Brumfield

THE WITNESS: Yes.
MS. CAROL BRUMFIELD,
called as a witness, having first been
duly sworn, was examined and testified as
follows:
THE COURT:

Be seated here.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MS. BALDWIN:
Q

Would you please state your name and

spell your last name for the record.
A

Carl Brumfield, B-R-U-M-F-I-E-L-D.

Q

What is your occupation?

A

I'm a registered nurse.

Q

And how long have you been a nurse?

A

Oh, gosh. 35 years.

Been at Mountain

View Hospital for seven as head nurse of the
nursery and pediatrics.
Q

Is that where you're currently

employed?
A

Yes.

Q

Do you have any children?

A

I have three sons.

Q

And how old are they?

A

24, 22 and 21.

Q

And you're employed at Mountain View
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ll Hospital.

Is that in Payson?

21

A

Yes.

3

Q

Do you recall sometime in early July of

4

1992 an instance in which you had contact with

5

Faith Barney?

6

A

Yes, I do.

7

Q

What was the nature of that contact?

8

A

Faith had come in to the hospital to

9
10

have surgery on a fractured elbow.

And they did

her surgery and felt that it was extensive

111 enough she should be admitted, which she was
12

admitted to our pediatric unit.

13

Q

14

Do you recall the exact date that that

would have been?

15

A

16

7th.

17

It was like the 6th of July. 6th or
It was right after the 4th of July.

Q

18

Was anyone with Faith when she came to

the hospital that day?

19

A

20

Well, I wouldn't know when she came to

the hospital, because she went directly to

211 same-day surgery.
22

Came to us after she'd had

the surgery, and had gone to the recovery room.

23
24

Q

Did you see her with anyone at that

A

Well--and she came up in the evening

time?

251

I
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1

after I'd gone, but her mother and Blu were

2

there the next morning when I came on duty.

3
4

Q

Barney or Gerald Blubaugh?

5
6

Are you acquainted with either Christy

A

I've seen Christy several times, and

I've seen Blu under much shorter circumstances.

7

Q

So you recognized him at that time?

81

A

Yes, I did.

91

Q

Describe what happened when you saw

A

Well, the situation that-- that was a

10
Ill
12

them.

morning--

13
14

MR. MUSSELMAN:

Your Honor, may we

approach for a moment?

15

THE COURT:

You may.

161

( Off the record at the bench, not

171

reported. )

18

Q

19

(BY MS. BALDWIN)

Where exactly were

Christy and Blu?

201

A

21

pediatrics.

221

Q

That's Faith's room?

23

A

That was Faith's room that she was

24
251

They were in her room, 2003, on

given after she came back from-Q

And where were each of those
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1

individuals located in the room?

2

A

Christy was sitting in a chair

3

immediately as you go in to the door on the

4

right. It was breakfast time.

5

tray to the mother. And she was eating, and

6

Faith was sitting in a highchair with a cast on

7

her arm, and Blu was over on a cot that we

8

provide.

9
10

Q

We do serve a

Was-- maybe I missed this.

Where was

Christy in proximity to Faith?
h

11

Christy was sitting at her side of the

12

bed.

I mean, the highchair was between Christy

13

and the bed, and Christy was sitting in a chair

14

right by the wall, by the window.

Very close.

15

Q

Did you observe Blu move from the cot?

16

A

I did.

17

Q

And what happened when he moved?

18

A

Christy--

19

Q

First of all, where did he move to?

20

A

He moved from the cot and walked toward

21

the foot of the crib.

221

Q

And what did you observe?

23

A

I observed-- when I went in, I was just

24

talking to Faith a minute.

25

happy and smiling.

And she was kind of

And Blu got off his cot and
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1

walked over.

2

had kind a kind of terrified

3

And Faith looked over at him

MR. MUSSELMAN:

4

a characterization.

5

she observed —

6
7

If she's telling

characterization

of what she

THE COURT:
she

I'll

object to any
observed.

She can testify as to what

observed.
THE WITNESS:

And she looked over at

13

him, and then kind of with-- what

14

to me a terrified

MR. MUSSELMAN:

16

THE W I T N E S S :

MR. MUSSELMAN:

I'll
—

object to —

and then she

looked

Wait

just a moment,

ma'am.

201

The testimony

21

Blu.

221

question.

23

characterization

251

appeared

over at her mother.

18

241

I—

look —

15

19

what

I'm telling you what I

MR. MUSSELMAN:

12

17

about

to

observed.

10
11

look —

I'm going to object

THE W I T N E S S :

81
9

and

And

is that she looked

I think it's time for the

over at

next

Beyond that, we're getting

into a

of how it looked to m e .

THE W I T N E S S :

I understood that

that's

what she asked m e .

Lesley Nelson —

CSR

1053

1

THE COURT:

She can testify as to what

2

she observed, and you can follow up with the

3

next question, counsel.

4
5
6
7

MS. BALDWIN:

point, we'll move on to something else.
Q

(BY MS. BALDWIN)

Are you familiar with

the practice known as swaddling--

8]

A

9

Q

10

Well, I think at this

I'm not too familiar with that.
-- with children?

Wrapping them in a

blanket?

Ill

A

Oh, sure.

121

Q

Do you work a lot with newborn —

131

A

I'm over the newborns.

141

Q

So you work with young children most of

15
161

the time?
A

That's my job.

I'm a manager for the

17

nurses who do that, plus I also take direct

18

patient care.

19
20

Q

So is the-- is the practice of

swaddling used generally with newborns?

21

A

Oh, I think that's-- I think we do.

22

Q

That's a typical practice?

23

A

I would think it's a nature, too, just

24
25|

to the fact that they're newborns.
Q

Do you work with any children that are
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older than newborns?
A

Our pediatric unit takes the child and

youth to 18.
Q

Would this practice of swaddling be

common in children, say, eight months old?
A

Possibly.

Q

Is there a general timeframe where you

would expect a child to be swaddled, where that
would be a normal procedure?
A

I don't know that you could put a date

on it. I think some children like to be swaddled
and some just don't.
Q

Is that the standard that you use to

determine whether you swaddle the child or not?
A

Not age, necessarily.

the need of the child is.

It's just what

If the child cries,

or seems lonely, or-Q

What their reaction is to it?

A

Uh-huh.

Q

Would you say that it would be unusual

fo: an older child several months old to be
swaddled?
A

Not unusual.
MS. BALDWIN:

I'm sorry.

No further questions.

Just a couple more questions.
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1
2
3

Q

(BY MS. BALDWIN)

You stated that

you've been a pediatric nurse for 35 years?
A

No. I've been an R.N. for 35 years.

I

4

taught at B.Y.U. for 17 years, probably five of

5

which of that was teaching at Primary.

61
7

I was also a community education manager at
Primary before I came to Mountain View.

And I

81 also was head nurse of the newborn and Ped. Unit
9

at a hospital in Mississippi for two years prior

10

to that.

11

in the Neonatal Intensive Care unit in Baton

12

Rouge, Louisiana.

13
14

Q

A

16|

Q

171

A

191

So you've had an extensive dealings

with children and their reactions—

15

18

And four years prior to that I worked

Well, I feel--- to various circumstances?
Not that we can always get them, but I

feel like I do.
Q

Is one of your methods of caring for

201

children looking to see how they react under

21

certain circumstances and responding to that?

22
23
24
251

A

Always.

That's something we always do

is observe that child.
Q

When Mr. Blubaugh got up and went

towards Faith you observed an expression on her
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1

face; is that correct?

2

A

I did.

3

Q

How did you characterize that

41 expression?
5

MR. MUSSELMAN:

Objection.

Calls for

6

an opinion that neither this witness nor any

7

other can give to interpret the intent of an

81 infant with an expression on her face.
9
10

MS. BALDWIN:

I don't believe it's an

improper opinion. I believe that anyone

111 experienced with children would be able to give
12

that properly, that that objection would go to

13

the weight, not to the admissibility.

14

MR. MUSSELMAN:

Well, the reason it's

15

objectionable, Your Honor, is if we have a half

16

a dozen experts and expressions on the part of

17

children, we'll probably have a half a dozen

18

opinions as to what-that expression meant.

19
20

THE COURT:

So no one can testify

as

it relates to the response of a child?

21

MR. MUSSELMAN:

I don't think anyone

22

can.

23

qualified as an expert of time in interpreting

241

expressions of a child.

25

Certainly this witness has not been

THE COURT:

Anything
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1

MS. BALDWIN:

2

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.
She has 35 years of

3

experience as an R.N. and other capacities,

4

deals specifically over that period of time with

5

the responses and reactions of children as

a—

61 now as a head pediatric nurse.
7j

I'll allow her to respond.

81

MS. BALDWIN:

91

THE COURT:

10

THE WITNESS:

What was your —
What did you observe?
She-- her eyes kind of

11

opened.

12

lowered her eyes, and looked at her mother.

13
14
15

Q

A

I have no further

questions.
THE COURT:

19

21

What did you

Fear.
MS. BALDWIN:

18

20

(BY MS. BALDWIN)

interpret that to be?

16
17

Her-- she kind of looked forward, and

CROSS

You may cross examine.
EXAMINATION

BY MR. MUSSELMAN:
Q

Mrs. Brumfield, how many times in the

22

past have you been called upon in a court of law

23

to give an opinion as to interpreting the

241 meaning of a child's expression?
251

A

In a court of law, I haven't.
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1

Q

Never before?

21

A

No.

3

charted it.

41

Q

I'm going to get to that in a minute.

5i

A

Okay.

61

Q

My first question is:

I have at the hospital, and we've
We've talked to doctors.

In a court of

7

law, and the answer is never until today; is.

8

that right?

91

A

Never until today.

Q

Now, outside of a court of law how many

10
11

times have you been called upon to interpret the

121 communication intended by a child by a facial
13

expression?

14

A

151

I would say we do it daily.

assessments daily.

16|

Q

17

verbal

18

A

communications?
Yes.

interpret fear.

20

easily.

22
23

We watch children.

To interpret facial expressions into

191

21

We do

We can interpret pain, we can
We can interpret happiness very

Q

How old was this child on the 1st of

A

She was about 14 months.

July?
She was born

24| in April
251

Q

Okay. In your experience, in the 35
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1

years as a registered nurse, not all of that has

2

been in child care or pediatrics; is that true?

3

A

Not all.

4|

Q

How much of it has been in pediatrics?

5

A

I would say probably near 15 years.

61

Q

In your experience, at least 15 years

7

of which has been in pediatrics, have you

8

observed occasions when either yourself or

9

others have come up with differing

10

interpretations from a child's facial

11

expressions?

12
13
14

A
usually.
Q

Oh, I guess sometimes, but not
We all seem to kind of agree.
How do you know the difference in a

151 child's expression between fear and pain?
16

A

Well, you're-- pain, you don't always

17

get the wide eyes, and it doesn't come on

18

suddenly.

19

cry, some of them don't in pain.

20

Q

It's more of a quiet.

Some of them

How do you tell the difference in a

211 13-month-old child's facial expression as to
22
23

whether it's fear or whether it is surprise?
A

I'm not sure there's a lot of

24

difference. But surprise doesn't have the gloomy

25

look that you get with fear.
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1
2

Q

How do you tel3

a child's

3| whether

the difference

facial expression whether

it's

between

it's fear or

startle?

41

A

Well, startle usually

51

Q

When we say "startle", we mean t h e - -

6|

A

And usually with startling there's a

7
8|
9

neurological
Q

is fully

instant.

response to that, a startle

reflex.

How long did you stay in the room

Christy, and Blu, and Faith and observe

with

from

the

10

time of the child's reaction that you say you

11

observed?

121
131
14

A

How long did you stay in the

I was in the room probably about

Q

At what point

in the five minutes

the reaction of the child occur that

16

observed?

18j
19
20

five

minutes.

15

171

room?

A

Halfway through, probably.

little more than
Q

you

Maybe a

halfway.

So maybe another two minutes

and you left the

did

after

that

room?

21

A

Uh-huh. Which we talked with

22\

And Blu stood

at the

23

did not enter

in.

bottom

of

the

bed,

Christy.

but

24

Q

Was the child crying any of that

25

A

No.

She didn't

he

time?

cry,
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1
2

Q

Was she clinging during any of that

A

No, but she was-- she had slid to the

time?

3

41 side of her chair a little.
5

Q

Slid around a little?

6

A

Uh-huh.

7

MR. MUSSELMAN:

81

THE COURT:

9

MS. BALDWIN:

That's all I have.

Anything further?
Nothing further, Your

10

Honor. We would ask that this witness be

111

excused.

12

MR. MUSSELMAN:

13

THE COURT:

14

THE WITNESS:

15

THE COURT:

16

MS. BALDWIN:

17

No objection.

Thank you very much.
You bet.
You may be excused now.
The State calls Cory

Blubaugh.

18

THE COURT:

19

Mr. Blubaugh, if you'd

come forward and be sworn, please.

20

THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear that

21

the testimony you shall give in the case now

22

pending before the Court will be the truth, the

23

whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help

24

you God.

25

THE WITNESS: Yes.

I
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11 was neglect."

M r . Blubaugh told you when he

2

testified that when he moved in with Faith and

3

Christy in February, there were no physical

4

injuries to Faith.

5

physical injuries to Faith prior to February of

6

1992.

71

No one has testified to any

The only suggestion of a physical injury

81 would be the possible drop on the head and the
9

perhaps the suggestion that an eye rolling back may

10

have somehow been involved, but Dr. Berman told you

111

that that was not the case.

121

report of that.

131

that cleared.

14
15

That there was no

The foster mother told you that

The crly evidence we have on that is that
it most likely occurred while the baby was in the

16] care of a babysitter, not in the care of Christy.
17

There was simply no other evidence of physical

18

abuse.

191

Since February of 1992 all of the injuries

2 01 that I have described took place.

That's when

21

M r . Blubaugh moved in with Christy.

22

important, of injuries to Faith, perhaps the broken

23

back was the most interesting.

24
25

But even more

Dr. Frikke testified about it that the
only way that those ligaments could have been

. i&£3

1

transected was for the baby to have literally been

21 folded in half.

She told you that that was a very

31 unusual injury.

I think she said she had never

4

investigated the death of a child and seen that as

5

an injury in connection with that.

#|
7

Dr. Britton, I believe testified that it
was unusual.

It's almost a signature injury.

81 Remember what Blu told you.

Rona Harding said that

91 Blu held the baby tight to the point that the baby
10

was struggling for air; to the point that it was

11

difficult for the baby to cry.

12

Now, Mr. Blubaugh said, "That's an

13

exaggeration.

"Sure, I held the baby like that,

14

and I held the baby in a fetal position to put the

15

baby to bed --" corroborating that method of care

16

—

"but I just didn't squeeze that tight."

17

There was absolutely no evidence that no

18

one else, including Christy, ever engaged in that

19

kind of holding and in that kind of behavior to put

20

the child to bed.

21

Blu's medical knowledge and experience was

22

undisputed.

He was a medic in the Army.

That

23

doesn't make him a doctor, but he told you he knows

24

that when a baby is deprived of oxygen, when a baby

25

is severely struck on the head, that that could

i&£3

